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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS AND JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON
In this section:
• U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Law Facilitating Compensation for Victims of Iranian
Terrorism
• Russia Argues Enhanced Military Presence in Europe Violates NATO-Russia Agreement;
United States Criticizes Russian Military Maneuvers over the Baltic Sea as Inconsistent
with Bilateral Treaty Governing Incidents at Sea
• U.S. Secretary of State Determines ISIL Is Responsible for Genocide
• United States Blocks Reappointment of WTO Appellate Body Member
• U.S. Department of Defense Releases Report of Investigation Finding That October 2015
Air Strike on Doctors Without Borders Hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, Was Not a War
Crime
• United States Expands Air Strikes Against al-Shabaab; State Department Legal Adviser
Discusses Legal Justification for Counterterrorism Operations Abroad
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Law Facilitating Compensation for Victims of Iranian Terrorism
On April 20, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Bank Markazi, aka Central Bank
of Iran v. Peterson, which upheld the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012. The Act “makes available for postjudgment execution” by American victims of Iran-
sponsored acts of terrorism a specific group of assets held in New York on behalf of the Central
Bank of Iran.1 Emphasizing that foreign policy judgments by the political branches require
“respectful review by courts,” the Court rejected Iran’s argument that the statute violated sep-
aration of powers principles.2 The main practical effect of the Bank Markazi decision was to
clear the way for certain plaintiffs to collect on existing merits judgments in their favor.3 In
response, Iran filed a claim against the United States with the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) under the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the two countries.4
The Bank Markazi decision results from efforts by victims of Iran-sponsored acts of terror-
ism, including the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks bombing,5 to collect on judgments they won
against Iran.6 The framework for their claims was established by the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The FSIA sets a baseline rule of foreign sovereign immunity, pro-
viding that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States.”7 The Act then carves out various exceptions to that immunity, one
of which pertains to state sponsored terrorism.8
Congress originally enacted the terrorism exception in 1996 (and amended it in 2008) in
response to various plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to sue countries responsible for terrorist
attacks.9 The relevant text lifts sovereign immunity if two conditions are satisfied. First, the
plaintiff must bring a case
1 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (2016).
2 Id. at 1317.
3 See id.
4 See ICJ Press Release, Iran Institutes Proceedings Against the United States with Regard to a Dispute Concern-
ing Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity ( June 15, 2016), at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/164/
19032.pdf.
5 “At approximately 6:25 a.m. Beirut time, . . . [a] truck crashed through a concertina wire barrier and a wall of
sandbags, and entered the barracks. When the truck reached the center of the barracks, the bomb in the truck det-
onated. The resulting explosion was the largest non-nuclear explosion that had ever been detonated on the face of
the Earth.” Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56 (D.D.C. 2003) (footnote omitted). “As
a result of the Marine barracks explosion, 241 servicemen were killed . . . .” Id. at 58. “The United States has long
recognized Iran’s complicity in this attack.” Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320 n.6. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-523,
pt. 1, at 9 (1996) (“After an Administration determination of Iran’s involvement in the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut in October 1983, Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism on January 19,
1984.”)).
6 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1316.
7 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1604 (2012).
8 28 U.S.C. §1605A. See also John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 102 AJIL 350, 350 (2008).
9 “The bill I am introducing today will bring clarity to this law on behalf of victims of terrorism and reaffirm their
right to sue and collect damages from state sponsors of terrorism. There are several reasons why the law needs to
be improved. First, the courts decided in 2004 in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran that, contrary to the
intent of the Flatow amendment, there would be no Federal private right of action against foreign governments.
The ruling stated that there could only be legal action against individual officials and employees of that government.
Second, current law permits judgment holders to only seize assets over which a terrorist state has day-to-day man-
agerial control, thereby allowing terrorist states to hide their assets from the victims who have successful judgments
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in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death
that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage tak-
ing, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or pro-
vision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent
of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment,
or agency.10
Second, the defendant state must have been officially designated a “state sponsor of ter-
rorism”11 by the Secretary of State as defined under section 1605A of the FSIA.12 If both
conditions are satisfied, the defendant state cannot raise a sovereign immunity defense to
that suit.
The terrorism exception has proved controversial, both within the United States and inter-
nationally. From the outset, State and Justice Department officials advised against enacting the
exception,13 noting that it would put the United States out of step with the practice of other
states regarding sovereign immunity.14 They warned that not only could such a deviation erode
the credibility of the FSIA as a whole,15 but that it could also interfere with foreign policy deci-
sions, such as the imposition of sanctions.16 Furthermore, the State Department had advised
that enactment of the exception might prompt other states to respond by enacting their own
reciprocal exceptions, perhaps for “other kinds of alleged wrongdoing that could be of concern
to us.”17
The ICJ has described the terrorism exception as virtually unique. In a case assessing the
legality of Italy’s exception to foreign sovereign immunity for serious human rights violations,
the ICJ said the American terrorism exception had “no counterpart in the legislation of other
States [and] [n]one of the States which enacted legislation on the subject of State immunity has
made provision for the limitation of immunity on the grounds of the gravity of the acts
against them. Third, state sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya, which is still responsible for terrorist acts it com-
mitted in the past, have consistently abused the appeals process to delay litigation proceedings. My new legislation
will address these issues and improve the ability of victims to hold state sponsors of terrorism accountable.” 153
CONG. REC. S10791-01, 10793 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
10 28 U.S.C. §1605A(a)(1).
11 Id., §1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). “[T]he term ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ means a country the government of which
the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.” Id., §1605A(h)(6).
12 Additionally, the claimant/victim must have been a national of the United States or member of the armed
forces or “otherwise an employee of the Government of the United States” when the act occurred and, if the act
occurred in the foreign state against which the claim is brought, the claimant must afford “the foreign state a rea-
sonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim.” Id., §1605A (a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
13 See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. (1994).
14 See id. at 13–14 (prepared Statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State) (“We
are not aware of any instance in which a state permits jurisdiction over such tortious conduct of a foreign state with-
out territorial limitations.”).
15 Id. at 14.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 15.
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alleged.”18 (One month after the ICJ decision, Canada enacted a similar exception for terrorist
acts.19)
A number of plaintiffs have relied on the FSIA’s terrorism exception to secure jurisdiction
against Iran and win billions of dollars in default judgments. The winning plaintiffs, however,
faced a problem when it came to execution: although the terrorism exception permits personal
jurisdiction over Iran, victims of terrorism often found it practically and legally challenging to
identify Iranian assets that would actually be subject to collection proceedings.20 As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained,
Subject to stated exceptions, the FSIA shields foreign-state property from execution.
When the terrorism exception was adopted, only foreign-state property located in the
United States and “used for a commercial activity” was available for the satisfaction of
judgments. Further limiting judgment-enforcement prospects, the FSIA shields from exe-
cution property “of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own
account.”21
In response to the difficulties that plaintiffs encountered, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA),22 which lifts FSIA immunity against attachment and execution
for certain assets that have been “blocked” by the executive branch:23
Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . in every case in which a person has
obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism . . .
the blocked assets24 of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or
instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid
of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages
for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.25
In 2012, President Barack Obama signed a sweeping executive order that blocked “[a]ll
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, including the Central Bank of
18 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99,
para. 88 (Feb. 3).
19 State Immunity Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18 Can.). Canada’s exception states, in relevant part: “A foreign state
that is set out on the list referred to in subsection (2) is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court in proceedings
against it for its support of terrorism on or after January 1, 1985.” Id. at 6.1.
20 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (2016) (No.
14-770). The majority of judgments remained unpaid. Id. at 1320.
21 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318 (citations omitted). The “commercial exception” provides that “[t]he prop-
erty in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be
immune from attachment in aid of execution.” 28 U.S.C. §1610. As relevant here, §1611 stipulates that “[n]ot-
withstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from attach-
ment and from execution, if (1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own
account, unless such bank or authority, or its parent foreign government, has explicitly waived its immunity from
attachment in aid of execution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (emphasis added).
22 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
23 See id.
24 A number of programs including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Trading with the
Enemy Act “authorize the President to ‘block’ particular assets in the United States.” In general, blocking programs
prohibit transactions concerning property of the targeted foreign government in the absence of Executive Branch
authorization. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (No. 14-770).
25 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. §201(a) (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1610(f)(1)(A)).
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Iran, that are in the United States.”26 While this order clearly triggered the TRIA exception to
FSIA execution immunity for all covered assets, its applicability to some assets was nonetheless
contested. In the specific cases that eventually led to the Supreme Court’s Bank Markazi deci-
sion, for example, successful judgment plaintiffs sought and obtained restraints on the transfer
of Iranian assets held in a New York bank account pursuant to the FSIA’s terrorism judgment
execution provisions.27 When plaintiffs initiated an action for turnover under the TRIA,28
however, Iran argued that the precise language of the TRIA’s ownership requirements had not
been satisfied. In short, “Bank Markazi contended that the blocked assets were not assets ‘of ’
Bank Markazi,” but instead “were ‘of ’ a financial intermediary which held them in the United
States on Bank Markazi’s behalf.”29
Largely in response to Iran’s efforts to narrowly interpret the TRIA’s ownership language,
Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.30 Section
8772 of that Act explicitly targets the specific assets at issue in the district court proceedings
that gave rise to the Supreme Court’s Bank Markazi decision.31 Section 8772(a) makes avail-
able for execution “a blocked asset (whether or not subsequently unblocked) that is property
described in subsection (b) . . . in order to satisfy judgment to the extent of any compensatory
damages” caused by the acts of terrorism enumerated in the FSIA’s terrorism exception.32 Sec-
tion 8772(b) then defines the relevant assets as those “identified in and the subject of proceed-
ings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained
by restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in those proceedings.”33
Before allowing execution against an asset described in section 8772(b), a court must first
determine that the asset is:
(A) held in the United States for a foreign securities intermediary doing business in the
United States;
(B) a blocked asset (whether or not subsequently unblocked) . . . ; and
(C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, including an asset of the central bank or mon-
etary authority of the Government of Iran.34
26 Exec. Order No. 13,5999, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659, 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012) (emphasis added).
27 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320 n.10.
28 See id.
29 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318 n.3. “[T]he bond assets have been held in a New York account at Citibank
directly controlled by Clearstream Banking, S.A. (Clearstream), a Luxembourg-based company that serves ‘as an
intermediary between financial institutions worldwide.’ Initially, Clearstream held the assets for Bank Markazi and
deposited interest earned on the bonds into Bank Markazi’s Clearstream account. At some point in 2008, Bank
Markazi instructed Clearstream to position another intermediary—Banca UBAE, S.p.A., an Italian bank—
between the bonds and Bank Markazi. Thereafter, Clearstream deposited interest payments in UBAE’s account,
which UBAE then remitted to Bank Markazi.” Id. at 1321 (citations omitted).
30 See id. at 1318.
31 See Peterson, 2013 WL 1155576, at *24.; see also Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“Although Iran argues that the TRIA ownership requirements have not been satisfied, we need not reach
this issue in light of Congress’s enactment of § 8772.”).
32 22 U.S.C. §8772(a)(1) (2012).
33 Id., §8772(b).
34 Id., §8772(a)(1).
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The court must then determine that “Iran holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in,
the assets” and that no other person possesses “a constitutionally protected interest in the
assets” under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.35 Only then does
the court order the turnover of the assets in satisfaction of valid judgments.
In response to the renewed motions by plaintiffs in these cases relying on section 8722, the
District Court made the required findings and ordered the relevant assets to be turned over to
plaintiffs36 on “the two independent bases of TRIA section 201(a) and 22 U.S.C. § 8772.”37
It rejected Iran’s argument that that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine because
the Act “effectively dictates the outcome of this one case.”38 On appeal, the Second Circuit
upheld the District Court’s decision.39 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.40
In a 6–2 decision, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit and rejected Iran’s separation of
powers challenge to section 8772.41 The Court dismissed in particular Bank Markazi’s argu-
ment that section 8772 impermissibly “directed certain factfindings and specified the outcome
under the amended law.”42 The Court noted the long-established principles that legislation
may be “particularized,”43 that Congress may “make valid statutes retroactively applicable to
pending cases,”44 and that Congress “may indeed direct courts to apply newly enacted, out-
come-altering legislation in pending civil cases.”45 The Court was therefore unmoved by the
fact that section 8772 deals with “a limited category of cases”46 that are “identified by caption
and docket number.”47 In the Court’s view, the Act simply establishes “new substantive stan-
dards, entrusting to the District Court application of those standards to the facts (contested or
uncontested) found by the court.”48 While the Court suggested that at least one of the relevant
findings might not be a foregone conclusion in this case,49 it held that “[i]n any event, a statute
does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to
undisputed facts.”50
35 Id., §8772(a)(2).
36 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320–21.
37 Peterson, 758 F.3d at 189.
38 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518, 2013 WL 1155576, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2013); Brief for Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari at 19, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No.
14-770).
39 Peterson, 758 F.3d at 188.
40 Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015).
41 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1322.
42 Id. at 1325.
43 Id. at 1327.
44 Id. at 1324, (quoting RICHARD FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 323, n.29 (7th ed. 2015)).
45 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1325.
46 Id. at 1326 n.23.
47 Id. at 1326.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 The District Court made findings related to the definitions of “beneficial interest” and “equitable title.” Id.
at 1325 n.20. Furthermore, “§8772 required the District Court to determine whether the Bank owned the assets
in question.” Id. In this particular case, however, Bank Markazi conceded that “Iran held the requisite ‘equitable
title to, or beneficial interest in, the assets.” Id. at 1321.
50 Id. at 1325. This holding in particular appears to have severely limited the implications of some famous lan-
guage from United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872), perhaps to the vanishing point. See id. at 146 (stating that
Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department . . . in [pending] cases”).
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These general doctrinal observations were framed without regard to the specific subject
matter of section 8772. But the Supreme Court concluded by emphasizing “that §8772
is an exercise of congressional authority regarding foreign affairs, a domain in which the
controlling role of the political branches is both necessary and proper.”51 By blocking or
governing the availability of foreign-state assets for attachment, Congress and the presi-
dent act “[i]n pursuit of foreign policy objectives.”52 While the precise role played in the
Court’s conclusion by these foreign affairs considerations was not specified, the Court
emphasized that such foreign policy measures “have never been rejected as invasions upon
the Article III judicial power.”53
In dissent, Justices Roberts and Sotomayor observed that “Congress has decided this case by
enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case that resolves the parties’ specific legal disputes
to guarantee respondents’ victory.”54 They claimed that the Act thus worked a particular “type
of unconstitutional interference with the judicial function, whereby Congress assumes the role
of judge and decides a particular pending case in the first instance. Section 8772 does precisely
that, changing the law—for these proceedings alone—simply to guarantee that respondents
win. The law serves no other purpose.”55 In the dissenters’ view, the Constitution prohibits
such action by the legislature.
Five days after the Supreme Court decision was issued, Iran vowed to “sue the United
States at the International Court of Justice at The Hague to prevent the distribution of
nearly $2 billion in impounded assets.”56 Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was quoted
by the Iranian state news agency as saying: “We have announced since the beginning that
[the] Iranian government does not recognize the U.S. extra-territorial law and considers
the U.S. court ruling to blockade Iranian funds null and void and in gross violation of the
international law.”57 The same week, Iran suggested that it was considering an unspecified
retaliation.58 In a letter released by Iran’s United Nations Mission to Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon, Zarif wrote:
The principle of state immunity is one of the cornerstones of the international legal order
and a rule of customary international law. . . . Its primacy has also been recognized by the
community of nations, all legal systems and the International Court of Justice. . . . It is a
matter of grave concern that the United States Congress, along with other branches of the
U.S. Government, seem to believe that they can easily defy and breach the fundamental
51 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328.
52 Id.
53 Id. See also id. at 1322 (“Article III of the Constitution establishes an independent Judiciary, a Third Branch
of Government with the ‘province and duty . . . to say what the law is’ in particular cases and controversies.”) (quot-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
54 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1330 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 1332.
56 Rick Gladstone, Iran Threatens Lawsuit in StreetHague Court Over U.S. Ruling on $2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2016, at A6.
57 Patrick Goodenough, Iran Threatens to Take US to Int’l Tribunal Over Supreme Court Terror Payout Ruling,
CNS NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016) at http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/iran-threatens-take-us-intl-
tribunal-over-supreme-court-terror (alteration in original).
58 Rick Gladstone, Iran Hints at Retaliation Over U.S. Use of Seized Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2016, at A3.
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principle of state immunity, by unilaterally waiving the immunity of states and even Cen-
tral Banks in total contravention of the international obligations of the United States and
under a groundless legal doctrine that the international community does not recognize.59
The Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (CoB) also disparaged Bank
Markazi as inconsistent with international law:60 “The CoB objects to US defiance to inter-
national law through the unilateral waiving of the sovereign immunity of States and their
institutions in total contravention of the international and treaty obligations of the United
States and under a spurious legal ground that the international community does not
recognize.”61
On June 14, 2016, Iran filed a claim against the United States at the ICJ.62 The pleadings
allege “violations by the Government of the United States of America of the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States of America,”63
including by denying “fair and equitable treatment” and “freedom of access to the courts,” by
“applying unreasonable or discriminatory measures,” and by taking property of Iranian nation-
als without “prompt payment of just compensation.”64
In its ICJ pleadings, Iran alleges that the United States violated these obligations by under-
taking a series of
legislative and executive acts that have the practical effect of subjecting the assets and inter-
ests of Iran and Iranian entities, including those of the Central Bank of Iran (also known
as “Bank Markazi”), to enforcement proceedings in the United States, even where such
assets or interests . . . “are held by Iran or Iranian entities . . . and benefit from immunities
from enforcement proceedings as a matter of international law, and as required by the
[1955] Treaty.”65
Iran also notes that “United States courts ‘have repeatedly dismissed attempts by Bank Markazi
to rely on the immunities to which such property is entitled” and maintains that “‘the assets
of Iranian financial institutions . . . have already been seized, or are in the process of being seized
and transferred.’”66 Iran also alleges violations relating to the U.S. courts’ failure to recognize
59 Letter from Dr. Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to Ban Ki-moon, UN
Secretary General (Apr. 28, 2016), available at http://iran-un.org/en/2016/04/28/28-april-2016-letter-of-h-e-
dr-m-javad-zarif-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-addressed-to-h-e-ban-ki-moon-
secretary-general-united-nations/.
60 See Communiqué by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement in Rejection of Unilateral
Actions by the United States in Contravention of International Law, in Particular the Principle of State Immunity




62 ICJ Press Release, Iran Institutes Proceedings Against the United States with Regard to a Dispute Concerning
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity ( June 15, 2016), at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/164/190
32.pdf. The treaty entered into force on June 16, 1957.
63 Id. at 1.
64 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, 284 UNTS 93, 110,
112, 114, 116, 118.
65 ICJ Press Release, supra note 62, at 1 (alterations in original).
66 Id.
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the “separate juridical status (including the separate legal personality) of all Iranian compa-
nies.”67 A State Department spokesman responded to notice of the filing by stating that “we
believe that the United States has acted consistent with its obligations under international
law.”68
Russia Argues Enhanced Military Presence in Europe Violates NATO-Russia Agreement; United
States Criticizes Russian Military Maneuvers over the Baltic Sea as Inconsistent with Bilateral
Treaty Governing Incidents at Sea
In February 2016, the United States and NATO announced plans to expand their military
presence in Europe. Russia responded by claiming that the United States and NATO had vio-
lated the NATO-Russia Founding Act (Founding Act).1 Around the same time, the Russian
air force conducted a series of maneuvers over the Baltic Sea that—in the view of the United
States—were inconsistent with the Incidents at Sea Treaty (INCSEA) between the United
States and Russia.2 Russia defended the legality of the flights.
The Founding Act is an international instrument signed by Russia, NATO, and each
individual NATO member state in 1997, at a time when NATO was considering whether
to admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungry into the alliance.3 While the Founding
Act is styled as a political agreement,4 Russian President Boris Yeltsin described the act as
“a firm and absolute commitment for all signatory states.”5 The Founding Act includes
language that addresses the stationing of permanent forces in new NATO member states.
According to the Agreement,
NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance
will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interop-
erability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional perma-
nent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on ade-
quate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context,
reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat
67 Id. at 2.
68 Asa Fitch, Iran Sues U.S. in International Court Over Frozen Assets, WALL ST. J. ( June 16, 2016), at http://
www.wsj.com/articles/iran-sues-u-s-in-international-court-over-frozen-assets-1466027629.
1 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,
N. Atl. Treaty Org.-Russ., May 27, 1997, 36 ILM 1006 [hereinafter Founding Act].
2 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, U.S.-Soviet Union, May 25,
1972, 23 UST 1168 [hereinafter INCSEA Treaty].
3 See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States, 92 AJIL 494, 495–96 (1998); Michael
R. Gordon, Russia Agrees to NATO Plan Pushed by Clinton to Admit Nations From Eastern Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 1997, at A18; The White House Press Release, Fact Sheet, NATO Russia Founding Act (May 27, 1997), at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/05/1997-05-27-fact-sheet-on-nato-russia-founding-act.html.
4 See, e.g., Founding Act, supra note 1 (“The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the
one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, . . . based on an enduring political commitment undertaken
at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles
of democracy and cooperative security.”) (emphasis added).
5 The White House Press Release, Remarks by President Clinton, French President Chirac, Russia President
Yeltsin, and NATO Secretary General Solana at NATO/Russia Founding Act Signing Ceremony (May 27, 1997),
at https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe/19970527-814.html; see also Gordon, supra note 3; Jack Mendel-
sohn, The NATO Russian Founding Act, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (May 1, 1997), at https://www.
armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/jm.
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of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and
the [Organization forSecurity andCo-operation inEurope]governingprinciples, aswell as for
exercises consistent with the adapted [Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe],6 the
provisionsof theViennaDocument19947 andmutuallyagreedtransparencymeasures.Russia
will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.8
In February 2016, the United States announced that it would double its military presence
in Eastern Europe as part of its European Reassurance Initiative.9 In particular, the United
States would add a rotational combat brigade, which would consist of approximately 3,000 to
4,000 soldiers, and pre-position additional military equipment, such as ammunition, fuel,
artillery, and combat vehicles.10 Ambassador Douglas Lute, the U.S. Permanent Representa-
tive to NATO, addressed the consistency of these plans with the Founding Act:
This of course is all in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Some would
claim otherwise, but they’re frankly wrong. The NATO-Russia Founding Act allows for
improvements in infrastructure such as this prepositioning that I’ve outlined. These are
rotational troops that I’ve described, not permanent troops. And the majority of the prepo-
sitioning will be in Western Europe, not in the East.11
Not long after the Obama administration announced these changes to the European Reas-
surance Initiative, NATO announced that it would also enhance its presence in Eastern and
Central Europe. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that “NATO Defence
Ministers agreed on an enhanced forward presence in the eastern part of our Alliance” and that
the additional forces would be “multinational, to make clear that an attack against one Ally is
an attack against all Allies, and that the Alliance as a whole will respond.”12 Similar to the
Obama administration’s announcement, NATO announced that the force would be “rota-
tional and supported by a programme of exercises; and it will be complemented by the nec-
essary logistics and infrastructure to support pre-positioning and facilitate rapid reinforce-
ment.”13 NATO later announced, in June 2016, that the additional combat forces will consist
6 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, S. TREATY DOC. 102–08, 30 ILM 1 (estab-
lishing limits on the conventional military equipment that the state parties to the Treaty of Washington and the
Treaty of Warsaw may station in Europe).
7 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], Vienna Document 1994, OSCE DOC.FSC/
2/95 (Nov. 28, 1994) (establishing security confidence building measures between the member states of the Con-
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe).
8 Founding Act, supra note 1.
9 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Telephonic Press Briefing on the European Reassurance Initiative, Major
General David W. Alvin, Director of Strategy and Policy U.S. European Command (Feb. 29, 2016), at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/useuropeanmediahub/transcripts/2016/253810.htm [hereinafter Major Alvin Briefing];
see also The White House Press Release, Statement by the President on the FY2017 European Reassurance Initiative
Budget Request (Feb. 2, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/02/statement-presiden
t-fy2017-european-reassurance-initiative-budget (announcing a four-fold increase in ERI funding for fiscal year
2017).
10 See Alvin Briefing, supra note 9.
11 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Telephonic Press Briefing with Ambassador Douglass Lute, U.S. Permanent
Representative to NATO (Feb. 9, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/useuropeanmediahub/transcripts/20
16/252314.htm.
12 N. Atl. Treaty Org. Press Release, NATO Boosts its Defence and Deterrence Posture (Feb. 11, 2016), at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_127834.htm.
13 Id.
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of four multinational battalions, and they will deploy on a rotational basis to the Baltic states
and Poland.14
Russia argued that NATO’s plans to expand its presence in Europe were inconsistent with
the Founding Act because NATO intended to station permanent troops in new member states.
According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,
[w]hat we see on the NATO Eastern flank is the continuous rotation of US troops and the
troops of its allies, almost daily military exercises, and the construction of new military
infrastructure. Taken together, these steps are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the
NATO-Russia Founding Act and alter the military and political landscape in a major way,
especially in northeastern Europe, making it an area of heightened tension instead of a
peaceful and stable area in the military sense, which [it] was only recently.15
Lavrov later stated that NATO “has already violated the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act,
which stipulates clearly that there should be no permanent stationing of substantial combat
forces in new NATO member states.”16
NATO defended the troop buildup on several grounds. Stoltenberg acknowledged that
“[t]here will be troops there all the time,” but he emphasized that NATO was “not speaking
about permanent based troops; . . . they will be on a rotational basis.”17 He also pointed out
that “‘[s]ubstantial combat forces’ was never defined when the NATO-Russia Founding Act
was agreed in 1997.”18 He elaborated:
[In 1997] there were different proposals on the table. And even if you take into account
the Russian proposal we are well below their definition of substantial combat forces. We
speak about a battalion-size presence. And that’s in no way something which can be
assessed as violating the NATO-Russia Founding Act.19
Finally, Stoltenberg pointed out that Europe’s security environment has “very much changed”
since Russia and NATO signed the Founding Act in 1997.20 Such change is significant because
the Founding Act states that NATO’s commitment regarding permanent troops applies “in the
current and foreseeable security environment.”21
U.S. officials had made similar arguments on previous occasions. In 2014, Obama and Esto-
nian President Toomas Ilves pointed out the changed circumstances during a joint news con-
ference where Ilves stated:
14 Jens Stoltenberg, Sec’y Gen., N. Atl. Treaty Org., Pre-Ministerial Press Conference ( June 13, 2016), at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_132272.htm.
15 Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of Russia, Address at the Fifth Moscow Conference on International Security
(Apr. 27, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_
publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/2256120.
16 Interview with Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of Russia, in Moscow, Russia (Apr. 28, 2016), at HYPERLINK
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2258885 [hereinaf-
ter Lavrov Interview]; see also Interview with Alexander Grushko, Russian Permanent Representative to NATO
(May 31, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/nota-bene/-/asset_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/content/
id/2297957.
17 Jens Stoltenberg, Sec’y Gen., N. Atl. Treaty Org., Press Conference with Members of the Bundespressekon-





21 See supra text accompanying note 8.
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I suggest all those who say we can’t do anything because of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act read the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which says that these conditions hold—to
quote— “in the current and foreseeable” future, or “the security environment of the cur-
rent and foreseeable” future. That was the security environment of 1997, when Boris Yelt-
sin was President, and there had been no violations of either the U.N. Charter or the 1975
Helsinki Final Act, [or] the 1990 Paris Charter.
So I would argue this is an unforeseen and new security environment, and therefore one
has to hold on to certain provisions. It does not mean we have to give up the whole act,
but certainly when an agreement in certain parts no longer holds, well, then it’s time to
make a change.
I mean, the NATO-Russia Founding Act has been violated by Russia. We continue to sup-
port the vision of that document, but its substance has changed dramatically, and I am con-
fident that all of NATO’s actions are and will be conducted in accordance with its inter-
national commitments as an alliance.22
Obama agreed that “the circumstances clearly have changed.”23 In 2015, Secretary of Defense
Ashton Carter fleshed out this perspective, stating that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine had vio-
lated the Founding Act, which requires that NATO and Russia comply with the UN Charter.24
Carter stated that “[s]ince Russia began its campaign against Ukraine early last year,” Russia
has “violat[ed] the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords, and the NATO-Russia Founding
Act, as well as the commitment it made in Budapest [in 1994 through] the Budapest Mem-
orandum.”25
As the dispute about the U.S. and NATO plans for a troop buildup continued, Russia
conducted a series of military maneuvers near U.S. military assets that the United States
described as dangerous, unprofessional, and potentially in violation of international law.
According to the U.S. Defense Department, on April 11, 2016, while the U.S.S. Donald
Cook was conducting training exercises in the Baltic Sea, two Russian fighter jets made
“numerous close-range and low altitude passes” of the ship.26 One day later, a Russian heli-
copter and two Russian fighter jets again made repeated, low-range passes over the U.S.S.
Donald Cook “in a simulated attack profile.”27 On April 14, 2016, a “Russian aircraft did
a barrel roll over an Air Force RC-135U reconnaissance aircraft operating in international
airspace,”28 and another Russian jet similarly intercepted an American reconnaissance
plane on April 29, 2016.29




24 Ashton Carter, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Remarks at Atlantik Brücke: “U.S., Germany, & NATO Are Moving
Forward Together” ( June 22, 2015), at http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606684
[hereinafter Secretary Carter Remarks]; Founding Act, supra note 1.
25 Secretary Carter Remarks, supra note 24.
26 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Navy Ship Encounters Aggressive Russian Aircraft in Baltic Sea (Apr.
13, 2016), at http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/720536/navy-ship-encounters-aggressive-
russian-aircraft-in-baltic-sea [hereinafter Dep’t of Defense Press Release].
27 Id.
28 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, NATO-Russia Council to Meet for First Time Since 2014 (Apr. 19,
2016), at http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/737397/nato-russia-council-to-meet-for-first-time-
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The United States stated that Russia’s military maneuvers were inconsistent with the bilat-
eral INCSEA Treaty, which the United States and Russia signed at the 1972 Moscow Summit
after a series of collisions between U.S. and Russian naval forces.30 According to Article IV of
the treaty,
Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in
approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in
particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual
safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft
and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near
them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.31
After describing the Russian military’s close interactions with the U.S.S. Donald Cook in early
April, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest read from Article IV of the INCSEA and claimed
that it was clear that “the conduct of the Russian military pilots in this particular incident is incon-
sistent with that agreement.”32 Secretary of State John Kerry then spoke with Lavrov to register the
UnitedStates’ “strongobjections tounsafemaneuvers executedbyRussianmilitaryaircraftover the
USS Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea.”33 The Pentagon similarly raised concerns that Russia’s series
of maneuvers were unsafe and could have led to conflict. According to a press release responding
to the incidents involving the U.S.S. Donald Cook, U.S. military officials stated that “[t]hese
actions have the potential to unnecessarily escalate tensions between countries, and could result in
a miscalculation or accident that could cause serious injury or death.”34
Russia denied the U.S. accusations that its military maneuvers were unprofessional and denied
that theyviolatedRussia’s internationalobligations.AccordingtoRussianDefenseMinistryMajor-
General Igor Konashenkov, the Russian aircraft that approached the U.S.S. Donald Cook spotted
“theshipwithinthevisibilityzone, [and] theRussianpilots turnedtheiraircraft awayfromthevessel
fully observing the safety measures.”35 The military official stated that, “all flights of aircraft of the
RussianAerospaceForces areperformedstrictly inaccordancewith the international regulationson
since-2014; Sophie Tatum & Barbara Starr, Russia Denies Wrongdoing After Jet Barrel-rolls over U.S. Aircraft, CNN
(Apr. 17, 2016), at http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/16/politics/russian-jet-barrel-rolled-us-aircraft/.
29 Barbara Starr, Russians ‘Barrel Roll’ over Another U.S. Air Force Plane, CNN (Apr. 29, 2016), at http://www.
cnn.com/2016/04/29/politics/russians-barrel-roll-air-force-plane/; US Accuses Russia over Baltic Jet Manoeuvre,
BBC (Apr. 29, 2016), at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36175973.
30 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over
the High Seas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm (last visited July 15, 2016).
31 INCSEA Treaty, supra note 2.
32 The White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Josh Earnest (Apr. 14, 2016), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/14/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-41416.
33 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Secretary Kerry’s Phone Call With Foreign Minister Lavrov (Apr. 15, 2016),
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/255870.htm.
34 Dep’t of Defense Press Release, supra note 6.
35 USS Donald Cook was About 70 km from Russian Navy Base When Warplanes Passed it, TASS RUSS. NEWS
AGENCY (Apr. 14, 2016), at http://tass.ru/en/defense/869555 [hereinafter RUSS. NEWS AGENCY]; see also Lavrov
Interview, supra note 16 (“The Russian aircraft were on a legitimate training flight in this area, which is high seas
airspace. They saw a heavily armed US destroyer approaching a Russian military base and decided to take a closer
look. As soon as they saw who it was, with the fly-by happening at a safe distance, they turned back and continued
their flight.”).
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the use of airspace over neutral waters,” and he added that the U.S. naval ship and the Russian air-
craft both had equal rights of navigation in international waters and airspace.36
While Lavrov linked the dispute over the Russian naval maneuvers to the dispute over the
Founding Act, he did not suggest that the maneuvers were formal countermeasures:
When we hear these days that Russia has been carrying out dangerous manoeuvres near
NATO borders, I think that this is merely a mean-spirited attempt to turn the issue
on its ears. In its expansion efforts, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is getting
closer and closer to Russia’s borders. The Alliance has already violated the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act, which stipulates clearly that there should be no perma-
nent stationing of substantial combat forces in new NATO member states. However,
despite these obligations, NATO military infrastructure is inching closer and closer
to Russia’s borders. But when Russia takes action to ensure its security, we are told that
Russia is engaging in dangerous manoeuvres near NATO borders. In fact, NATO bor-
ders are getting closer to Russia, not the opposite. We have a saying in Russia: If you
want to understand what the people surrounding you want from you, you have to start
by understanding why they have surrounded you. This is what we are trying to do. The
latest incident in the Baltic Sea was related to a US destroyer armed with dozens of
cruise missiles navigating in just a few dozen kilometres from the Russian military base
in Baltiysk, which is Russian territory.37
U.S. Secretary of State Determines ISIL Is Responsible for Genocide
On March 17, 2016, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made a formal determination that
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh1 or as the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), “is responsible for genocide.”2 This announcement marks only the
second time that the United States has attached that label to an ongoing crisis.3
The U.S. Congress had been pushing the administration to make such a determination.
Last December, a provision attached to a spending bill gave Kerry ninety days to determine
whether the persecution of “Christians and people of other religions in the Middle East
by violent Islamic extremists . . . constitutes mass atrocities or genocide.”4 On March 14,
36 RUSS. NEWS AGENCY, supra note 35.
37 Lavrov Interview, supra note 16.
1 Da’esh is an Arabic acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa ash-Sham—meaning the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham. When spoken in Arabic, Da’esh sounds similar to the Arabic phrase for “sowers of discord” or “one
who crushes underfoot.” The term has a pejorative connotation, and several different countries have started using
it instead of ISIS or ISIL in order to deny legitimacy to the terrorist organization. See generally Orlando Crowcroft,
Why ISIS Hates Being Called Daesh: What’s the Correct Name for the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorists?, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/why-isis-hate-being-called-daesh-whats-correct-name-world
s-most-dangerous-terrorists-1531506. Kerry started using the term Daesh instead of ISIL in December, 2014. See
Adam Taylor, ‘Daesh’: John Kerry Starts Calling the Islamic State a Name they Hate, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014),
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/05/daesh-john-kerry-starts-calling-the-is
lamic-state-a-name-they-hate.
2 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Sec’y of State John Kerry, Remarks on Daesh and Genocide (Mar. 17, 2016),
at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/254782.htm [hereinafter Kerry Remarks].
3 Adam Chandler, How Meaningful is the ISIS Genocide Designation?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2016), at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/isis-genocide-designation/474414/; see also John R.
Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 99 AJIL 266 (2005).
4 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. § 7033 (2015).
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2016 —three days before the statutory deadline—the House of Representatives unani-
mously passed a concurrent resolution expressing the view that the “atrocities perpetrated
by ISIL against Christians, Yezidis, and other religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and
Syria constitute . . . genocide.”5 The House exhorted all governments and international
organizations to “call ISIL atrocities by their rightful names: war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.”6
By this time, a number of other countries had already condemned ISIL for engaging in geno-
cide. In August 2014, the Iraqi Parliament designated ISIL’s acts in “north Iraq a genocide”
and called on the international community to “prosecute ISIS and to hold responsible the states
and institutions that support or finance their activities.”7 Later that month, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel also accused ISIL of genocide.8 In September 2015, a representative of
the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq stated that what “religious minorities are
suffering is ‘genocide’” and called on world leaders to use the word “genocide” in their state-
ments and speeches.9 The Council of Europe voted in January 2016 by a margin of 117 to 1
that ISIL was committing genocide.10 The next month, the European Parliament followed suit
by voting to recognize the occurrence of genocide.11
During a press briefing on March 16, 2016—the day before Kerry’s announcement—the
State Department Deputy Spokesperson emphasized that the process of making a determina-
tion with respect to genocide involved “a very detailed, rigorous legal analysis.”12
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 194813 and ratified by
the United States in 1988.14 In a declassified 2004 memorandum about genocide in Darfur,
the State Department expressed the view that this treaty text supplies “the internationally
5 H.R. Con. Res. 75, 114th Cong. (2016). The Resolution passed by a vote of 393 to 0. Final Results for Roll Call
112, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 14, 2016), at http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/2016/roll112.xml.
6 H.R. Con. Res. 75, 114th Cong. (2016).
7 Iraqi Parliament Resolution Calls ISIS Acts Genocide, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 7, 2014), at
http://www.aina.org/news/20140807164526.htm.
8 Katie Pavlich, State Department Declares ISIS is Committing Genocide Against Christians in Iraq and Syria,
TOWNHALL (Mar. 17, 2016), at http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2016/03/17/breaking-isis-
genocide-n2135279.
9 Indefenseofchristians, Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman KRG Representative to the U.S. Speaks at the 2015 IDC Con-
vention, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2015), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?vaWL0f4MZXi0.
10 Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. 2091( Jan. 27, 2016), available at http://assembly.
coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-en.asp?FileID22482&langen.
11 Joint Motion for a Resolution, EUR. PARL. DOC. RC1085712EN (Feb. 3, 2016), available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bMOTION%2bP8-RC-
2016-0149%2b0%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN.
12 The White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Deputy Spokesperson Mark C. Toner (Mar. 16, 2016), at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/03/254764.htm [hereinafter Toner Press Briefing].
13 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277 [here-
inafter Genocide Convention].
14 Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 81-15 (Feb. 19, 1986), CONGRESS.GOV, at https://www.congress.
gov/treaty-document/81st-congress/15 (last visited July 1, 2016) (passed by a vote of 83 to 11); Steven V. Roberts,
Reagan Signs Bill Ratifying U.N. Genocide Pact, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 1988), at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/1
1/05/opinion/reagan-signs-bill-ratifying-un-genocide-pact.html.
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accepted definition” of genocide “under customary international law.”15 The 2004 memoran-
dum also notes that the prohibition on genocide is a part of customary international law and
“a preemptory norm of international law (i.e., ‘jus cogens’).”16
The Genocide Convention defines genocide in terms of two elements: the act and the mental
state.17 Article II of the Convention lists five separate categories of actions in regard to a pro-
tected group that satisfy the act requirement:
(a) Killing members of a protected group;
(b) Causing serious bodily injury or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.18
A group or individual satisfies the mental state of this crime by committing a genocidal act
“with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” a protected group, “as such.”19 The United
States ratified the Genocide Convention with an understanding that “the Convention requires
a specific intent to destroy a group in whole or substantial part, at least within a given coun-
try.”20 In a 2007 decision, the International Court of Justice also addressed the intent require-
ment.21 The Court noted that each of the acts enumerated in Article II include mental ele-
ments; the acts must be deliberate or intentional.22 In addition, the Court said, Article II
requires the establishment of the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, . . . [the protected]
group, as such.” It is not enough to establish, for instance . . . that deliberate unlawful kill-
ings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be estab-
lished, and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as a special or specific intent or
dolus specialis; . . . . It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because
they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent.
Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II must be done with intent to
destroy the group as such in whole or in part.23
15 Memorandum on Genocide and Darfur from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to The
Deputy Secretary ( June 25, 2004), at 2, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB356/
20040625_darfur.PDF [hereinafter Darfur Memorandum].
16 Id.
17 See Otto Triffterer, Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such, 14 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L. 399, 399 (2001).
18 Genocide Convention, supra note 13, Art. 2.
19 Id.
20 Sean D. Murphy, Department of State Legal Analysis of 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 96 AJIL 258, 260 (2002)
(quoting a newly released 1994 State Department memorandum relating to genocide in Rwanda).
21 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 ICJ 140 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter ICJ Genocide Judgment].
22 Id., para. 186 (“‘Killing’ must be intentional, as must ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm.’ Mental elements
are made explicit in paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article II by the words ‘deliberately’ and ‘intended,’ quite apart from
the implications of the words ‘inflicting’ and ‘imposing’; and forcible transfer too requires deliberate intentional
acts. The acts, in the words of the [International Law Commission], are by their very nature conscious, intentional
or volitional acts.”) (citation omitted).
23 Id., para. 187.
2016] 569CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the Secretary of State has typically made the determination that geno-
cide has occurred or is occurring in a particular country.24 (By contrast, United Kingdom
Human Rights Minister Joyce Anelay declined to make a similar determination, arguing that
it is for judges, and not for government officials, to declare if genocide has taken place.25) An
excerpt of Kerry’s announcement follows:
My purpose in appearing before you today is to assert that, in my judgment, Daesh is
responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control, including Yezidis, Chris-
tians, and Shia Muslims. Daesh is genocidal by self-proclamation, by ideology, and by
actions—in what it says, what it believes, and what it does. Daesh is also responsible for
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing directed at these same groups and in some
cases also against Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and other minorities.
I say this even though the ongoing conflict and lack of access to key areas has made it impos-
sible to develop a fully detailed and comprehensive picture of all that Daesh is doing and
all that it has done . . . [O]ver the past months, we have conducted a review of the vast
amount of information gathered by the State Department, by our intelligence commu-
nity, by outside groups. And my conclusion is based on that information and on the nature
of the acts reported.
We know, for example, that in August of 2014 Daesh killed hundreds of Yezidi men and
older women in the town of Kocho and trapped tens of thousands of Yezidis on Mount
Sinjar without allowing access to food, water, or medical care. Without our intervention,
it was clear those people would have been slaughtered. Rescue efforts aided by coalition
airstrikes ultimately saved many, but not before Daesh captured and enslaved thousands
of Yezidi women and girls—selling them at auction, raping them at will, and destroying
the communities in which they had lived for countless generations.
We know that in Mosul, Qaraqosh, and elsewhere, Daesh has executed Christians solely
because of their faith; that it executed 49 Coptic and Ethiopian Christians in Libya; and
that it has also forced Christian women and girls into sexual slavery.
We know that Daesh massacred hundreds of Shia Turkmen and Shabaks at Tal Afar and
Mosul; besieged and starved the Turkmen town of Amerli; and kidnapped hundreds of
Shia Turkmen women, raping many in front of their own families.
We know that in areas under its control, Daesh has made a systematic effort to destroy the
cultural heritage of ancient communities—destroying Armenian, Syrian Orthodox, and
Roman Catholic churches; blowing up monasteries and the tombs of prophets; desecrat-
ing cemeteries; and in Palmyra, even beheading the 83-year-old scholar who had spent a
lifetime preserving antiquities there.
We know that Daesh’s actions are animated by an extreme and intolerant ideology that
castigates Yezidis as, quote, “pagans” and “devil-worshippers,” and we know that Daesh
has threatened Christians by saying that it will, quote, “conquer your Rome, break your
crosses, and enslave your women.”
24 Darfur Memorandum, supra note 15; see also Crook, supra note 3, at 267 (“[W]e concluded, I concluded, that
genocide has been committed in Darfur.”) (statement of then-Secretary of State Colin Powell).
25 Patrick Wintour, Ministers Criticized for Refusing to Act on Isis Genocide Motion, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21,
2016), at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/21/uk-government-criticised-for-refusing-to-act-on-
motion-accusing-isis-of-genocide.
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Shia Muslims, meanwhile, are referred to by Daesh as, quote, “disbelievers and apostates,”
and subjected to frequent and vicious attacks. In December, a year ago, a 14-year-old boy
named Usaid Barho approached the gate of a Shiite mosque in Baghdad, unzipped his
jacket to show that he was wearing an explosive vest and he surrendered to the guards. He
had been recruited by Daesh in Syria, and joined to serve Islam, but he was told after his
recruitment that, unless he obeyed every order, Shiites would come and rape his mother.
Daesh said of Shias, and I quote, “It is a duty imposed upon us to kill them, to fight them,
to displace them, and to cleanse the land of their filth.”
One element of genocide is the intent to destroy an ethnic or religious group, in whole or
in part. We know that Daesh has given some of its victims a choice between abandoning
their faith or being killed, and that for many is a choice between one kind of death and
another.
The fact is that Daesh kills Christians because they are Christians; Yezidis because they are
Yezidis; Shia because they are Shia. This is the message it conveys to children under its con-
trol. Its entire worldview is based on eliminating those who do not subscribe to its perverse
ideology. There is no question in my mind that if Daesh succeeded in establishing its so-
called caliphate, it would seek to destroy what remains of ethnic and religious mosaic once
thriving in the region.26
Kerry then addressed the role of future legal proceedings against individuals:
I want to be clear. I am neither judge, nor prosecutor, nor jury with respect to the alle-
gations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing by specific persons.
Ultimately, the full facts must be brought to light by an independent investigation and
through formal legal determination made by a competent court or tribunal. But the
United States will strongly support efforts to collect, document, preserve, and analyze
the evidence of atrocities, and we will do all we can to see that the perpetrators are held
accountable.27
As for the consequences of this announcement, Kerry said:
I hope that my statement today will assure the victims of Daesh’s atrocities that the United
States recognizes and confirms the despicable nature of the crimes that have been com-
mitted against them.
Second, I hope it will highlight the shared interest that otherwise diverse groups have in
opposing Daesh. After all, the reality of genocide underscores even more starkly the need
for a comprehensive and unified approach to defeating Daesh both in its core in Syria and
Iraq and more broadly in its attempt to establish external networks.28
At a press conference in February, a month before the announcement, White House Press
Secretary Josh Earnest explained that the Obama administration had not yet used the term
“genocide” to describe Daesh’s actions because “the use of that specific term has legal rami-
fications.”29 But during the run-up to Kerry’s announcement, the administration rejected the
26 Kerry Remarks, supra note 2.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 The White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Feb. 4, 2016), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-242016.
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view that the determination would trigger new international legal obligations. A State Depart-
ment spokesperson said that “acknowledging that genocide or crimes against humanity have
taken place in another country would not necessarily result in any particular legal obligation
for the United States.”30 He explained that the Genocide Convention’s obligation to prevent
genocide is territorially limited:
[I]t does create obligations on states to prevent genocide within their territory and [to]
punish genocide, so there is the accountability aspect of it. I think in this particular case,
there may not be—or there will not be a sea change in how we’re approaching Daesh . . . .
[W]e’re already very, for lack of a better word, hell-bent on destroying Daesh, removing
it from its enclaves in Syria and Iraq, because we already recognize what a murderous, bar-
baric terrorist group . . . it already is.”31
The Obama administration’s view that the obligation to prevent genocide is territorially
limited is consistent with the positions taken by prior administrations in the 2004 Darfur
memorandum and a 1994 memorandum regarding genocide in Rwanda.32 Some commen-
tators, however, disagree, citing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2007 decision inter-
preting the Genocide Convention.33 In that case, the ICJ explained the obligation to prevent
genocide in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention requires states to employ “all means rea-
sonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible.”34 The Court went on
to explain:
In this area the notion of “due diligence,” which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of
critical importance. Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly
discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to
another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to com-
mit, or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things,
on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on
the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities
of that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also
30 Toner Press Briefing, supra note 12.
31 Id.; see also John Hudson, Obama Administration Declares Islamic State Genocide Against Christians, FOREIGN
POLICY (Mar. 17, 2016), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/17/obama-administration-declares-islamic-state-
genocide-against-christians/ (“When pressed about the usefulness of the declaration, [a senior State Department
official] said the U.S. believes it is important to ‘document the history of what’s happened to these innocent people,’
formally recognize their suffering, galvanize the international community to help defeat the Islamic State and con-
tribute to the effort to document and analyze the group’s atrocities.”).
32 Darfur Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3 (“Based on the available facts, a determination that genocide has
occurred in Darfur would have no immediate legal—as opposed to moral, political, or policy—consequences for
the United States. In prior years, the Department rejected arguments by some human rights advocates . . . that
would impose a legal obligation on all Contracting Parties to take particular measures to ‘prevent’ genocide in areas
outside of their territory.”); Memorandum from Conrad Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to The Sec-
retary (May 20, 1994), at 2, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw052194.pdf (“A [U.S.
government] statement that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal consequences.
Under the Convention, the prosecution of persons charged with genocide is the responsibility of the competent
courts in the state where the acts took place or an international penal tribunal (none has yet been established); the
U.S. has no criminal jurisdiction over acts of genocide occurring within Rwanda unless they are committed by U.S.
citizens or they fall under another criminal provision of U.S. law (such as those relating to acts of terrorism for which
there is a basis for U.S. jurisdiction).”).
33 See, e.g., John Heieck, Daesh and the Duty to Prevent Genocide, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 6, 2016), at http://
opiniojuris.org/2016/04/06/daesh-and-the-duty-to-prevent-genocide/.
34 ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 21.
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be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits
permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depend-
ing on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger,
or the reality, of genocide.35
According to one commentator, whether the United States’ current efforts to combat ISIL
satisfy the ICJ standard is not entirely clear. A United States-led coalition has been “pounding
Daesh with airstrikes since mid-2014,” but “Daesh’s genocidal campaign continues.”36 To
fully satisfy the due diligence standard, this commentator argues that the United States,
together with the other members of the UN Security Council, should adopt a robust resolution
to address the situation.37 The UN Secretary-General has likewise urged the Security Council
to take further action “to end the religiously and ethnically-motivated violence sweeping the
region and [to] end impunity for those committing crimes against humanity.”38 As of the date
of publication, no such resolution has yet been adopted.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
United States Blocks Reappointment of WTO Appellate Body Member
On May 12, 2016, the United States announced its decision to block the reappointment of
Seung Wha Chang to a second term on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization
(W TO).1 This decision received widespread criticism, especially by South Korea, Chang’s
home state.
The seven-member Appellate Body, which generally acts by consensus, hears appeals from
W TO Dispute Settlement Body decisions regarding trade conflicts between member states:2
1. A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall
hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall
35 Id. According to the Court, a state’s obligations to act to prevent genocide “arise[s] at the moment instant that
the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be com-
mitted.” Id., para. 431.
36 See generally Heieck, supra note 33.
37 Id. (endorsing a resolution that would “inter alia, refer the situations in Iraq and Syria to the International
Criminal Court, impose arms embargos on Daesh and related groups, and authorize the deployment of a UN peace-
enforcing force to the areas in which Daesh is operating”).
38 UN Press Release, At Security Council, Ban Urges Action to End Violence Against Religious, Ethnic Minor-
ities in Middle East (Mar. 27, 2015), at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID50439#.V5kOJEB9
5hA.
1 Statement by the U.S. at the Meeting of the W TO Dispute Settlement Body 1 (May 23, 2016) [hereinafter
U.S. W TO Statement], available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.
pdf (footnotes and citations omitted). See Manfred Elsig, Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, The U.S. is Causing Con-
troversy in the World Trade Organization. Here’s What’s Happening., WASH. POST ( June 9, 2016), at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/06/the-u-s-is-trying-to-block-the-reappointment-
of-a-wto-judge-here-are-3-things-to-know/.
2 For background on the W TO dispute resolution system and the role of the Appellate Body in resolving trade
disputes, including procedures for appeals, see Understanding the W TO: Settling Disputes, W TO, at https://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited July 15, 2016). See also Dispute Settlement
Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Art. 2(4), THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]; Working Procedures for Appellate Review, W TO Doc.
W T/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010).
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serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such
rotation shall be determined in the working procedures of the Appellate Body.3
Appellate Body judges are appointed for an initial four-year term and can then be reappointed
for maximum of one additional four-year term:4
2. The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and
each person may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three of the seven persons
appointed immediately after the entry into force of the W TO Agreement shall expire at
the end of two years, to be determined by lot. Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person
appointed to replace a person whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the
remainder of the predecessor’s term.5
While any member state may block this second-term appointment, reappointments are typ-
ically routine and uncontroversial.6 The United States’ blocking of Chang’s reappointment
comes at a time when the W TO was already in the process of replacing another outgoing mem-
ber, leaving the current complement at five instead of seven.7
U.S. opposition to Chang’s reappointment was explained in terms of disagreement with sev-
eral cases in which panels on which Chang sat allegedly overstepped the scope of the Appellate
Body’s authority.8 Deputy United States Trade Representative (and United States Ambassa-
dor to the W TO) Michael Punke and United States Trade Representative General Counsel
Tim Reif issued a joint statement offering more detail:
The United States is strongly opposed to appellate body members deviating from their
appropriate role by restricting the rights or expanding trade agreement obligations [of
WTO members] . . . The United States will not support any individual with a record of
restricting trade agreement rights or expanding trade agreement obligations.9
The statement continued:
The integrity of the W TO depends on the stability of a healthy, well-functioning dispute
settlement system that fairly applies the international trade rules as they are in-fact
3 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 2, Art. 17 (1).
4 Id., Art. 17(2).
5 Id.
6 See Elsig, supra note 1.
7 See Arman Sarvarian & Filippo Fontanelli, The USA and Re-Appointment at the W TO: A ‘Legitimacy Crisis’?,
EJIL:TALK! (May 27, 2016), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-usa-and-re-appointment-at-the-wto-a-legitimacy-
crisis/.
8 See Elsig, supra note 1. The list of cases the United States Trade Representative pointed to included Appellate
Body Report, Argentina—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, W TO Doc. W T/DS453/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 14, 2016); Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricul-
tural Products, W TO Doc. W T/DS430/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2015); Appellate Body Report, United States—
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, W TO Doc. W T/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18,
2014); and Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Products
from China, W TO Doc. W T/DS449/AB/R (adopted July 7, 2014). The cases are not all disputes to which the
United States was a party, and the U.S. Trade Representative claims that unfavorable outcomes to the United States
are not the motivating factor behind opposing Chang. See Sarvarian, supra note 7.
9 Sarvarian & Fontanelli, supra note 7.
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written—and that does not attempt to rewrite the rules or write new rules that are incon-
sistent with the trade obligations that were carefully negotiated by the United States and
other W TO members.10
The United States Trade Representative provided several specific examples of conduct on the
part of the W TO Appellate Body the United States found objectionable:
First, in the recent DS453 appellate report in the financial services dispute between Pan-
ama and Argentina, more than two-thirds of the Appellate Body’s analysis—46 pages—is
in the nature of obiter dicta. The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s findings on likeness
and said that this reversal rendered moot all the panel’s findings on all other issues, includ-
ing treatment no less favorable, an affirmative defense, and the prudential exception under
the GATS. Yet, the Appellate Body report then went on at great length to set out inter-
pretations of various provisions of the GATS. These interpretations served no purpose in
resolving the dispute—they were appeals of moot panel findings. Thus, more than two-
thirds of the Appellate Body’s analysis is comprised simply of advisory opinions on legal
issues.
The Appellate Body is not an academic body that may pursue issues simply because they
are of interest to them or may be to certain Members in the abstract. Indeed, as the Appel-
late Body itself had said many years ago, it is not the role of panels or the Appellate Body
to “make law” outside of the context of resolving a dispute—in effect, to use an appeal as
an occasion to write a treatise on a W TO agreement. But that is what the report did in this
appeal.
Second, in DS430, a dispute in which the United States was the complaining party and
prevailed, we noted that the appellate report engaged in a lengthy abstract discussion of a
provision of the SPS Agreement without ever tying that discussion to an issue on appeal,
and even expressed “concerns” in that discussion on findings of the panel that were not
raised by either party in the appeal. Furthermore, during the hearing, the Appellate Body
devoted considerable time to an issue that the parties and the third parties agreed had not
been raised on appeal, involving an item that was not on the record, that had not been
raised by either party in its arguments, and had not been examined by the panel and was
not the subject of any panel findings. The questioning was of such concern that the United
States felt compelled to devote its entire closing statement to urging the Appellate Body
not to opine on that non-appealed issue.
It is not the role of the Appellate Body to engage in abstract discussions or to divert an
appeal away from the issues before it in order to employ resources on matters that are not
presented in, and will not help resolve, a dispute.
A third example occurred in DS437. The United States explained its concerns that the
Appellate Body report suggests a view of dispute settlement that departs markedly from
that set out in the DSU and reflected in numerous prior reports.
There, the Appellate Body report rejected a party’s appeal, but then went on to reverse the
Panel report and to find a breach on the basis of an argument and approach entirely of the
Appellate Body’s creation. This approach suggests that panels and the Appellate Body are
to conduct independent investigations and apply new legal standards, regardless of what
10 Victoria Guida, W TO Appellate Body Soon to Have Another Vacancy, POLITICO MORNING TRADE (May 12,
2016), at http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-trade/2016/05/tpp-death-watch-wto-appellate-body-soon-
to-have-another-vacancy-kerlikowske-time-for-cbp-to-get-tough-214258.
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either party actually argues to the panel or Appellate Body. But that is not right. Under the
DSU, panels and the Appellate Body are to consider the evidence and arguments put for-
ward by the parties to make an objective assessment of the matter before it.11
The United States has blocked reappointments on at least two previous occasions. In 2011,
the United States blocked the reappointment of Jennifer Hillman, an American, to a second
term, indicating dissatisfaction with her performance.12 The United States also blocked the
initial appointment of James Gathii, a law professor at Loyola University in Chicago who was
nominated by Kenya, in 2014.13 Other member states initially resisted the United States, caus-
ing the appointment process to deadlock; ultimately Kenya withdrew Gathii’s candidacy.14 In
contrast to the domestic judicial confirmation process in the United States, appointments to
the W TO’s Appellate Body tend to be fairly apolitical.15 Some commentators view the U.S.
opposition to Chang’s reappointment as a serious escalation in the politicization of Appellate
Body judicial appointments, since it is the first time the United States has blocked reappoint-
ment of a non-American judge.16
The United States’ decision to block Chang’s reappointment provoked significant contro-
versy among W TO member states.17 South Korea rebuked the United States in particularly
strong terms:
This opposition is, to put it bluntly, an attempt to use reappointment as a tool to rein in
Appellate Body members for decisions they may make on the bench . . . . Its message is
loud and clear: “If AB members make decisions that do not conform to U.S. perspectives,
they are not going to be reappointed.”18
South Korea declared that that it will oppose all other reappointments as a result of the United
States’ actions.19 At a May 23 meeting of WTO member states, additional concerns about the
11 U.S. W TO Statement, supra note 1 (citations omitted).
12 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, W TO Judicial Appointments: Bad Omen for the Trading System, PETERSON INST.
FOR INT’L ECONOMICS ( June 13, 2011), at https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/wto-judicial-
appointments-bad-omen-trading-system. For a discussion of how the blocking of Hillman’s reappointment might
be related to the “zoning” controversy, see Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Gov-
ernance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 71 (2016).
13 See Elsig, supra note 1. See also Gregory Schaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile)
Authority of the W TO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 271 (2016). For details on Gathii’s initial
nomination, see Gathii Nominated for W TO Job, DAILY NATION ( June 16, 2013), at http://www.nation.co.ke/
News/Gathii-nominated-to-W TO-Appellate-Body/-/1056/1883786/-/10kv1kwz/-/index.html.
14 See Howse, supra note 12, at 72.
15 See id.
16 See id.; see also Manfred Elsig & Mark Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and
Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the W TO Appellate Body, Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 4th
Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations 58 ( Jan. 27–29, 2011), available at
http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Conf4_Elsig-Pollack-24.01.2011.pdf (discussing the percep-
tion of the United States as affecting the outcomes of cases through judicial selection as early as 2007 with Jennifer
Hillman).
17 For particular criticisms from member states, see W TO Press Release, Members Debate Appointment/Re-
appointment of Appellate Body Members (May 23, 2016), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/
dsb_23may16_e.htm [hereinafter W TO Debate] (public summary of meeting minutes). For comments made by
trade envoys criticizing the United States, see D. Ravi Kanth, US Body Blow to DSU, Creating Systemic Crisis, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (May 17, 2016), at http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2016/ti160514.htm.
18 Alex Lawson, W TO Members Clash over Appellate Body Reappointment, LAW360 (May 23, 2016), at http://
www.law360.com/articles/799169/wto-members-clash-over-appellate-body-reappointment.
19 See Sarvarian & Fontanelli, supra note 7.
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United States’ decision were expressed by Brazil, China, the European Union, and India,
among others. Criticism focused especially on fears that the conflict might compromise the
integrity and impartiality of the Appellate Body, including by putting pressure on judges to rule
in particular ways by implicit threat of nonreappointment.20 The European Union labeled the
move by the United States “unprecedented” and called it “a very serious threat to the indepen-
dence and impartiality of current and future appellate body members.”21
At a June 22, 2016, meeting of the W TO, South Korea issued a formal joint statement with
fifteen other member states criticizing U.S. actions in blocking Chang:
[W]e are deeply worried that the reasons provided by a Member for disagreeing with the
reappointment are undercutting a basic premise that the rules-based W TO system is built
upon: the Members’ trust. . . . [We have] grave concerns that linking reappointment of an
AB Member with rulings in specific cases is tantamount to interfering with the Appellate
Body’s deliberations and thus risks undermining its impartiality and independence. . . .
Moreover, singling out one AB Member for criticisms directed at the Appellate Body
reports is unjustifiable; the reports are those of the “Appellate Body” and not of an indi-
vidual AB Member. . . . We agree that such actions risk creating a dangerous precedent
and should not be repeated. . . . We look forward to working with all Members to find a
constructive path that addresses the systemic concerns raised by Members, bearing in mind
the critical role that dispute settlement plays in safeguarding the multilateral trading sys-
tem.22
South Korea then issued its own separate response, detailing its disagreements with the U.S.
legal objections to each of the cases it cited in its May 23, 2016, statement. South Korea’s state-
ment concluded: “This approach is not only unbecoming of a leader of the multilateral trading
system; it is also destabilising.”23
Six sitting Appellate Body judges also criticized U.S. actions in a letter to the Chair of the
W TO’s Dispute Settlement Body, objecting in particular to the singling out of Chang for non-
reappointment. The six judges insisted that the Body’s rulings should be attributed to the body
as a whole:
With regard to accuracy, no case is the result of a decision by one Appellate Body Member,
nor should interpretations or outcomes be attributed to a single Member. . . . Appeals are
heard and decided by three Members who are chosen randomly to constitute the Division
for each case. . . . During a Division’s consideration of a case, there is always a formal,
intensive exchange of views, in person in Geneva, between the three Division Members
and the Appellate Body Members who are not on the Division . . . . Our reports are reports
of the Appellate Body.24
20 See W TO Debate, supra note 17.
21 Elsig, supra note 1. See also Shawn Donnan, US Accused of Undermining W TO, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 30,
2016), at https://next.ft.com/content/1b89a3b4-261d-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89.
22 Kanaga Raja, W TO Members Scold an Isolated US Over AB Veto, THIRD WORLD NETWORK ( June 24, 2016),
at http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2016/ti160621.htm [hereinafter W TO AB Veto]. See also W TO Press
Release, Compliance Panels Established in Disputes over Broiler Products, Tuna ( June 22, 2016), at https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dsb_22jun16_e.htm.
23 W TO AB Veto, supra note 23.
24 D. Ravi Kanth, AB Members Challenge US Over Reappointment of Seung Wha Chang, THIRD WORLD NET-
WORK (May 20, 2016), at http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2016/ti160516.htm.
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Shortly thereafter, all thirteen living emeritus members of the Appellate Body, including Amer-
icans, signed onto another letter to the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Board letter objecting
to the treatment of Chang:
[W]e think it urgent nonetheless to voice our consensus that this political decision by the
Members of the W TO must never be made in such a way that could threaten to politicize
W TO dispute settlement and imperil the impartial independence of every Member of the
Appellate Body that is required by the W TO Rules of Conduct. The continued impartial
independence of the W TO Appellate Body is essential to upholding the rule of law in
international trade; moreover, we see it as a prerequisite to providing security and predict-
ability for the rule-based multilateral trading system for the benefit of all of the Members
of the W TO.
A decision on the reappointment of a Member of the Appellate Body should not be made
on the basis of the decisions in which that Member has participated as a part of the divisions
in particular appeals, lest the impartiality, the independence, and the integrity of that one
Member, and, by implication, of the entire Appellate Body, be called into question. Nor
should either appointment or reappointment to the Appellate Body be determined on the
basis of doctrinal preference, lest the Appellate Body become a creature of political favor,
and be reduced to a mere political instrument. Rather, as provided in Article 17.3 of the
W TO Dispute Settlement Understanding, the standard for both appointment and reap-
pointment should be whether the person in question is “of recognized authority, with
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered
agreements generally.”25
The United States has called these letters “unfortunate,”26 suggesting that they represent
another example of the kind of inappropriate judicial conduct that underlies its original objec-
tions to Chang. Responding to the criticism that it was unfairly singling out Chang, the United
States also argued that Chang’s individual views were made clear by questions he asked on the
record during hearings, not necessarily by the Body’s rulings and opinions alone.27 The United
States responded further in a statement to the W TO Dispute Settlement Body:
We have also heard an argument that it is inaccurate to hold an individual Appellate Body
Member accountable for the reports that he signs because others have also signed the same
report. The suggestion appears to be that because more than one person expresses the same
views, none of the members should be held responsible for endorsing those views. This is
not how the system works and does a disservice to each Appellate Body Member who has
worked hard to be sure that a report accurately reflects their views. In fact, in a number of
instances an Appellate Body member has provided separate, individual views in a report.28
Given the current appointment structure, the two vacancies in the current W TO Appellate
Body may remain unfilled for some time. Various proposals have been floated to curtail the
increasing politicization of Appellate Body appointments more generally. One option would
be an “authoritative interpretation” by the W TO that reappointments are automatic in the
25 Letter from former Appellate Body Members to the Chair of the W TO Dispute Settlement Board (May 31,
2015), available at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/abletter.pdf.
26 W TO Debate, supra note 17.
27 See id.
28 U.S. W TO Statement, supra note 1.
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absence of agreed-upon charges such as grave misconduct or illness.29 Another approach would
move to single, longer appointment term, so as to avoid member states blocking the reappoint-
ment of judges with whose decisions or comments during the decision-making process they
find objectionable.30 Alternatively, an electoral system could be adopted for the Appellate
Body, allowing member states to nominate individuals and then to vote on nominees’ appoint-
ments (or Appellate Body members’ reappointments).31 A ban on judges sitting on cases
involving their home countries, as found in other international courts, could also be incorpo-
rated.32 For now, at least two vacancies will remain on the Appellate Body until the Chang dis-
pute is resolved.
USE OF FORCE AND ARMS CONTROL
U.S. Department of Defense Releases Report of Investigation Finding That October 2015 Air
Strike on Doctors Without Borders Hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, Was Not a War Crime
On October 3, 2015, U.S. forces in Kunduz, Afghanistan attacked a trauma center operated
by Doctors Without Borders, also known as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).1 MSF
explained:
[The organization] had been working in Kunduz since August 2011 when the Kunduz
Trauma Centre (KTC) was opened. The KTC is the only facility of its kind in north-east-
ern Afghanistan. The Trauma Centre provided high-quality, free surgical care to victims
of general trauma like traffic accidents, as well as those presenting with conflict-related
injuries such as from bomb blasts or gunshots. The hospital had 92 beds, which increased
exceptionally to 140 beds at the end of September 2015 to cope with the unprecedented
number of admissions. The KTC was equipped with an emergency department, three
operating theatres and an intensive care unit, as well as X-ray, a pharmacy, physiotherapy
and laboratory facilities.2
The air strike killed at least thirty people, of whom at least thirteen were civilians, and injured
many more. Following the strike, Army General John Campbell, then the commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, ordered an investigation to determine the cause of the incident and
whether the use of force complied with the law of armed conflict and the applicable rules of
engagement.3 On April 29, 2016, the U.S. Central Command released a declassified ver-
sion of the resulting report which concluded that—while U.S. forces were unaware that
29 D. Ravi Kanth, US “Undercutting” Members’ “Trust” in W TO by AB Veto, THIRD WORLD NETWORK ( June
23, 2016), at http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2016/ti160617.htm.
30 W TO Debate, supra note 18. The United States currently opposes the single-term system, for the same reason
it objects to de facto reappointment: disallowing member states to voice negative feedback in the form of blocking
reappointments does not allow for the removal of judges who are not performing their jobs properly. Sarvarian &
Fontanelli, supra note 7.
31 Sarvarian & Fontanelli, supra note 7.
32 Id.
1 See U.S. CENT. COMMAND, SUMMARY OF THE AIRSTRIKE ON THE MSF TRAUMA CENTER IN KUNDUZ,
AFGHANISTAN ON OCTOBER 3, 2015; INVESTIGATION AND FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS 1 (Apr. 29, 2016) [here-
inafter SUMMARY MEMORANDUM].
2 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, INITIAL MSF INTERNAL REVIEW: ATTACK ON KUNDUZ TRAUMA
CENTRE, AFGHANISTAN 2 (Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter MSF INTERNAL REVIEW].
3 See U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN, INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE AIRSTRIKE ON THE MÉDECINS SANS
FRONTIÈRES / DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS TRAUMA CENTER IN KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON 3 OCTO-
BER 2015 017-21 (Apr. 28, 2016) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION REPORT].
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they were striking a medical facility—the attack had violated both the applicable rules of
engagement and the international laws of armed conflict.4 The report did not conclude,
however, that the attack constituted a war crime, and none of the individuals involved have
been referred for prosecution.
To complete the report, Campbell appointed a lead investigator and two deputy investiga-
tors from outside Afghanistan5 because “[it]t was important that the officers investigating the
incident had the requisite seniority and independence to conduct a thorough and unbiased
inquiry.”6 The investigation team also included “over a dozen subject matter experts from sev-
eral specialty fields.”7 Over the course of the investigation, the team
visited the MSF Trauma Center site and several other locations in the city of Kunduz. The
team interviewed more than 65 witnesses including personnel at the Trauma Center,
members of U.S. and Afghan ground forces, members of the aircrew, and represen-
tatives at every echelon of command in Afghanistan. The team had full access to clas-
sified information.8
Campbell approved the report of the investigation on November 21.9 He provided an overview
of the report’s conclusions on November 25,10 after which the report was reviewed and
redacted to avoid disclosing classified information.11
The declassified report was released several months later, on April 29, 2016. This report
detailed the sequence of events culminating in the October 3 strike. Taliban and associated
insurgents had taken control of key locations in Kunduz on September 28, surprising U.S. and
Afghan forces with the speed and scope of their attack. In response, U.S. and Afghan forces
shifted their plans and resources to retake the city.12
The events that led to the air strike on the MSF trauma center began with an emergency call
for air support to special forces on the ground.13 Because of that call, the AC-130 aircraft that
later hit the MSF trauma center launched sixty-nine minutes before its originally scheduled
4 U.S. Cent. Command Press Release, U.S. Central Command Releases U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Investigation
into Airstrike on Doctors Without Borders Trauma Center in Kunduz, Afghanistan (Apr. 29, 2016), at http://
www.centcom.mil/news/press-release/april-29-centcom-releases-kunduz-investigation.
5 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM, supra note 1, at 1. The lead investigating officer was Army Major General William
Hickman, and the deputies were Air Force Brigadier General Robert Armfield and Army Brigadier General Sean
Jenkins. Id.
6 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Campbell via Telecon-
ference from Afghanistan (Nov. 25, 2016), at http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/
Article/631359/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-general-campbell-via-teleconference-fro [hereinafter
Campbell Briefing].
7 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM, supra note 1, at 1.
8 Id.
9 See INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 002.
10 See Campbell Briefing, supra note 6.
11 See U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Army General Joseph Votel,
Commander, U.S. Central Command (Apr. 29, 2016), at http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/
Transcript-View/Article/746686/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-army-general-joseph-votel-commander-
us [hereinafter Votel Briefing].
12 See INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 043–050, paras. 20–47; Campbell Briefing, supra note 6.
13 See Campbell Briefing, supra note 6 (describing the early launch as a response to a “troops-in contact situation”
(TIC)). Emergency calls result in immediate air support from available aircraft. See id.; see also Noah Schactman,
The Phrase That’s Screwing Up the Afghan War, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2009), at https://www.wired.com/2009/12/the-
phrase-thats-screwing-up-the-afghan-air-war/ (describing general purpose and execution of the TIC call).
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takeoff. According to the declassified report, this early launch had some important conse-
quences. Specifically,
[t]he aircrew did not receive any printed current operational graphics showing the planned
operating area and specifically did not have any charts that showed no[-]strike targets or
the location of the MSF Trauma Center. Additionally, none of the . . . products, or infor-
mation loaded into the AC-130 guidance systems contained [no-strike list] data for the
Kunduz area.14
As it turned out, the AC-130 was not needed to respond to the situation that triggered the
emergency call, and the AC-130 was diverted to provide close air support to the U.S. com-
mander in Kunduz.15
Although a U.S. officer e-mailed updated mission products to the AC-130 after it launched,
including information that identified the location of the MSF center, a mechanical failure pre-
vented the AC-130 from sending or receiving e-mail.16 As a result, the aircrew did not have the
MSF coordinates even though they had previously been added to the Department of Defense’s
no-strike list and disseminated to various levels of the U.S. chain of command.17
The strike on the MSF trauma center followed communications between the ground force
commander, Army Major Michael Hutchinson,18 the leader of the U.S. special operation team
in Kunduz; the joint terminal attack controller ( JTAC), a subordinate team member located
in the same compound as Hutchinson; and the aircrew of the AC-130. Around the time of the
AC-130’s launch, Hutchinson received the coordinates for the actual target, the Afghan
National Directorate of Security (NDS) headquarters,19 which was under Taliban control.20
Shortly thereafter, Hutchinson provided these coordinates to the aircrew.21 Before this trans-
mission occurred, the AC-130 “was fired on by a surface-to-air missile, and subsequently
moved several miles away from the city center,” where it then received the coordinates.22 This
maneuver, however, “degraded [the AC-130’s] ability to locate ground targets.”23
When the AC-130 finally arrived at the place identified by the coordinates, its sensor
observed a location in an open field.24 The aircrew then requested a detailed description of the
14 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 052, para 48 (footnote omitted).
15 Campbell Briefing, supra note 6.
16 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 052, para. 49.
17 See id. at 044–45, paras. 27–29; id. at 078–79, para. 108(a)(1)–(4); see also MSF INTERNAL REVIEW, supra
note 2 (“Due to the increased intensity of fighting in Kunduz, MSF reaffirmed the well-known location of the
[trauma center] by once again emailing its GPS coordinates to US Department of Defense, Afghan Ministry of Inte-
rior and Defense and US army in Kabul . . . . Confirmation of receipt was received from both US Department of
Defense and US army representatives, both of whom assured [MSF] that the coordinates had been passed on to the
appropriate parties.”).
18 Hutchinson’s name was redacted in the report but identified in a subsequent media report. See Matthieu
Aikins, Doctors with Enemies: Did Afghan Forces Target the M.S.F. Hospital?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 17, 2016),
at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/magazine/doctors-with-enemies-did-afghan-forces-target-the-msf-ho
spital.html.
19 See INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 053, para. 51.
20 See id. at 044, para. 26.
21 See id. at 054, para. 53.
22 Votel Briefing, supra note 11; see also INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 053, para. 52.
23 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM, supra note 1, at 2.
24 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 054, para. 55.
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target.25 Through an interpreter, Afghan forces gave Hutchinson an updated description of the
target as having “an outer perimeter wall, with multiple buildings inside of it” and “an arch-
shaped gate” on the compound’s north side.26 Relying solely on this description, the aircrew
incorrectly determined that the MSF hospital, rather than the NDS facility, was the target.27
The aircrew then observed the MSF hospital for several minutes to assess the activity there.
They relayed their observations to Hutchinson, who concluded—based solely on their
description—that “the compound was under Taliban control and that the nine personnel
observed were hostile.”28 He could not see the NDS facility from his location.29 The AC-130’s
line-of-sight equipment—which normally transmits secure video footage from the aircraft to
the JTAC30—“was inoperable due to a critical shortage of batteries,”31 leaving both Hutchin-
son and the JTAC without the same view as the aircrew. Following this exchange, the JTAC
told the aircrew that Hutchinson wanted the mission to “lighten the load for [the Afghan
ground forces’] infil[tration],” and stated further that the AC-130 would be “softening the tar-
get for partner forces.”32 Uncertain about what precisely this language meant, the aircrew
decided that Hutchinson’s intent was essentially for the AC-130 to “find bad things and . . .
shoot them.”33
Soon after, Hutchinson perceived a hostile act against Afghan ground forces based on the
“sound of automatic gunfire coming from the east-west road near the NDS facility.”34
Unaware that the AC-130 was targeting the MSF hospital instead of the NDS facility,
Hutchinson decided to authorize a strike.35 Contrary to his belief, Afghan ground forces were
then located nine kilometers from the NDS facility and were not being attacked.36 While the
MSF hospital was treating wounded Taliban members, the report determined that “[n]o indi-
viduals [there] were committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent,” and the center
“was not the target of the . . . mission.”37 This latter finding contradicted a statement made in
the immediate aftermath of the attack by the governor of Kunduz, Hamdullah Danishi, that
25 See id. at 057, paras. 59, 61.
26 See id. at 056–58, paras. 58, 61–62. One media story observed that this description does not resemble the
NDS facility’s distinctive layout, and suggested that Afghan forces might have intentionally misled Hutchinson in
order to target the MSF center because of its relationship with and treatment of Taliban members. See Aikins, supra
note 18. The Department of Defense report, however, did not reach this conclusion or even suggest it as a possibility.
27 See id. at 057–58, para. 62.
28 Id. at 056, para. 57.
29 See id. at 054, para 54 & n.105.
30 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Dan Lamothe, Pentagon: 2015 Strike on Doctors Without Borders Hospital in
Afghanistan Was Not a War Crime, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
checkpoint/wp/2016/04/29/pentagon-2015-strike-on-doctors-without-borders-hospital-in-afghanistan-was-
not-a-war-crime/.
31 See INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 054, para. 54.
32 Id. at 059, paras. 65–66.
33 Id. at 059–61, paras. 65–70.
34 Id. at 061–62, para. 74.
35 Id. at 061–62, paras. 74, 76. His intent, as relayed by the JTAC, was to “destroy targets of all opportunity”—
that is, both the physical compound and the people inside it. Id. at 063, para. 77.
36 Id. at 062, para. 76.
37 Id. at 095–96, para. 115(a)(2), (4); see also Votel Briefing, supra note 11 (“Our forces did not receive fire from
the trauma center during the incident, nor did the investigation find that insurgents were using it as a base for oper-
ations.”).
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“[t]he hospital campus was 100 percent used by the Taliban” to plot and carry out attacks in
the city.38
The AC-130 aircrew began the strike at 2:08 AM.39 At 2:19 AM, a U.S. officer received a
call from an MSF representative indicating that the MSF hospital was being hit by an air
strike.40 A U.S. battle captain then called the aircrew and asked if the strike was affecting “a
major compound south of their engagement area,” and the crew replied no—believing that
they were striking the NDS facility.41 Then the officer who had initially spoken with the MSF
representative called the MSF representative again to confirm the grid location of the MSF hos-
pital.42 After determining that the AC-130 was striking the MSF hospital, the officer informed
Hutchinson shortly after 2:33 AM, prompting him to radio the crew to cease fire.43
The report found that the strike ended at 2:37 AM, after the AC-130 had fired its last
round.44 According to reports published by MSF and the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan, however, the strike ended later. The MSF review indicated that the strike
“stopped between approximately 3am and 3[:]13am.”45 Similarly, the UN report highlighted
the MSF’s findings that “the airstrike continued for 30 minutes after MSF first informed
United States and NATO officials that the hospital was under aerial attack.”46 The U.S. report
did not address the discrepancy between its conclusions and those of MSF.
The U.S. Central Command’s report stated that “there were at least 30 fatalities (13 MSF
employees, 10 patients, and 7 others yet to be identified) and approximately 37 wounded.”47
That number appears to be based on MSF’s own estimate following the attack.48
38 Tim Craig & Craig Whitlock, Afghan Response to Hospital Bombing Is Muted, Even Sympathetic, WASH. POST
(Oct. 4, 2015), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-official-hospital-in-airstrike-was-a-taliban-
base/2015/10/04/8638af58-6a47-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html. The Afghan Ministry of Defense sim-
ilarly claimed that terrorists had entered the MSF center and used “the buildings and people inside as a shield.”
Lynne O’Donnell, Doctors Without Borders: 19 Dead in Clinic Airstrike, AP: THE BIG STORY (Oct. 3, 2015), at
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/069682e9bee94ce4a48e347ac4dc3ec0/doctors-without-borders-afghan-clinic-
bombed-3-staff-dead. The president of MSF International, Dr. Joanne Liu, denied these claims. See Joanne Liu,
MSF Denounces Blatant Breach of International Humanitarian Law, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES/DOCTORS
WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2015), at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-denounces-blatant-
breach-international-humanitarian-law.
39 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 066, para. 83.
40 Id. at 067, para. 84.
41 Id. at 067–68, para. 84.
42 Id. at 068, para. 86.
43 Id. at 068, paras. 86–87.
44 Id. at 068, paras. 85.
45 MSF INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 12. MSF has requested that the United States explain these con-
trasting timelines. Kunduz: Some of MSF’s Questions in Response to the U.S. Military Investigation into Their Attack
on the Hospital, MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES (Apr. 29, 2016), at http://www.msf.org/en/article/kunduz-some-
msf%E2%80%99s-questions-response-us-military-investigation-their-attack-hospital.
46 Rep. of the UN Assistance Mission in Afg., Afghanistan: Human Rights and Protections of Civilians in Armed
Conflict: Special Report on Kunduz Province 8 (Dec. 2015), available at https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/de
fault/files/special_report_on_kunduz_province_12_december_2015.pdf [hereinafter UNAMA Report].
47 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 070, para. 94.
48 See MSF INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 12; SUMMARY MEMORANDUM, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating
that the U.S. military did not independently verify MSF’s fatality report); see also RICHARD C. KIM & MOHAM-
MAD KABIR, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: COMBINED CIVILIAN CASUALTY (CIVCAS) ASSESSMENT OF AN AIR-
STRIKE ON A MEDICAL FACILITY IN KUNDUZ CITY ON 03 OCTOBER 2015, para. 3(a) (Nov. 2015), available
at https://www.shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2015/saceur/exec_sum.pdf (providing similar casualty figure
from NATO civilian casualty team investigation).
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Having discussed the basic facts of the incident, the report went on to make specific eval-
uative findings as requested by General Campbell. It began by stating the obvious: that the
AC-130 had “misidentified the intended objective . . . and mistakenly engaged the MSF
Trauma Center and personnel at the facility.”49 While the report emphasized that “US per-
sonnel directly involved in the strike did not know the building was a hospital,”50 it found seri-
ous fault with various members of the U.S. team.51
As an initial matter, the misidentification was the result of Hutchinson’s and the AC-130
commander’s “fail[ure] to maintain situational awareness of their operating area,” as well as the
aircrew’s failure “to attain the critical [no-strike list] information” before and after the
AC-130’s launch.52 According to the report, having experienced an equipment failure, the air-
crew should have contacted the operations center to obtain the critical no-strike list.53
Hutchinson compounded these initial errors when he “authorized an engagement of a com-
pound in direct violation of . . . Tactical Guidance and [rules of engagement],” in particular
by relying on others’ reports without following up to confirm their accuracy.54
The report also concluded that Hutchinson had “willfully violated the [rules of engagement]
and tactical guidance by improperly authorizing offensive operations.”55 Hutchinson had
operational authority to “employ fires in self-defense” against hostile acts.56 But, according to
the report, he “could not have reasonably believed that a hostile act warranting engagement . . .
existed.”57 Hutchinson and the aircrew “never positively identified a hostile act originating
from the MSF Trauma Center, nor did [they] positively identify a hostile act being committed
against [U.S. or Afghan forces], and no consideration was given for the potential for civilians
in the compound.”58
The report then went on to conclude that “[Hutchinson] and [the] aircrew failed to comply
with the [law of armed conflict].”59 According to the report, Hutchinson’s and the aircrew’s
actions were inconsistent with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions
in attack. First, “[Hutchinson] and the Aircraft Commander failed to make a proper determi-
nation that the [MSF hospital] was a lawful military objective.”60 Accordingly, the center
“should have been presumed to be a civilian compound.”61 Second, “any engagement of a tar-
get that is not a lawful military objective is facially disproportional. The MSF Trauma Center
49 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 074, para. 106(a).
50 Id. (emphasis added). Although the bulk of the report’s findings focused on the actions of U.S. personnel lead-
ing up to the strike, the report also concluded that “[w]hen select commands were notified that the Trauma Center
was being engaged . . ., on-shift leaders took insufficient steps that could have minimally mitigated damage to per-
sonnel [there].” Id. at 078, para. 108(a).
51 See, e.g., id. at 074, para. 106(a)(2).
52 Id. at 081, para. 109(a), (a)(2).
53 Id. at 081, para. 109(a)(2).
54 Id. at 082–83, para. 110(a).
55 See id. at 086, para. 112(a)(1).
56 Id.
57 See id. at 086, para. 112(a)(1)(a).
58 See id. at 089, para. 112(a)(2)(a)(ii).
59 Id. at 093, para. 114(a).
60 Id. at 095, para. 114(g)(5). See also Peter Margulies, Centcom Report on the Kunduz Hospital Attack: Accounting
for a Tragedy of Errors, LAWFARE (May 2, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/centcom-report-kunduz-
hospital-attack-accounting-tragedy-errors.
61 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 091, para. 113(g)(2).
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was not a lawful military objective. At the point of engagement, any use of force against it was
disproportional,” particularly because “[t]here were no legitimate circumstances requiring the
crew members to make decisions to engage without clarifying or requesting more informa-
tion.”62 Third, “[t]he aircrew failed to take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to
individuals they could not positively identify as combatants.”63
The report itself did not address whether Hutchinson’s or the aircrew’s actions constituted
a war crime.64 Nonetheless, following the public release of the report, Army General Joseph
Votel elaborated:
The investigation concluded that certain personnel failed to comply with the rules of
engagement in the law of armed conflict. However, the investigation did not conclude that
these failures amounted to a war crime.
The label [“war crimes” is] typically reserved for intentional acts—intentional targeting of
civilians or intentionally targeting protected objects or locations.65
Accordingly, the sixteen U.S. service members punished for their role in the strike were not
referred for prosecution. Instead, they were subject to “appropriate administrative or disciplin-
ary action . . . includ[ing] suspension and removal from command, letters of reprimand, for-
mal counseling, . . . extensive retraining . . ., and boards to evaluate the flight certification of
three aircrew members.”66
Votel’s focus on intentional acts tracks the definition of a war crime under the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Relevant acts defined as war crimes under the
Rome Statute include “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities”; “[i]ntentionally launching
an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civil-
ians. . . which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated”; and “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against . . . hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.”67 Crim-
inal liability attaches “only if the material elements [of the crime] are committed with intent
and knowledge.”68 “[A] person has intent where: (a) [i]n relation to conduct, that person means
to engage in the conduct; (b) [i]n relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”69 Some scholars
have pointed out that the Rome Statute’s high standard does not necessarily reflect customary
62 Id. at 091, para. 113(g)(1), (3).
63 Id. at 093, para. 113(g)(4)(f).
64 See id. at 073–96, paras. 106–116 (detailing findings of investigation).
65 Votel Briefing, supra note 11; see also SUMMARY MEMORANDUM, supra note 1, at 2 (using identical language
to define war crime and reiterating report’s finding that “none of the personnel knew that they were striking a med-
ical facility”). Votel repeated later in the same press conference that “an unintentional action takes it out of the realm
of actually being a deliberate war crime against persons or protected locations.” Votel Briefing, supra note 11.
66 SUMMARY MEMORANDUM, supra note 1, at 4.
67 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Art. 8(2)(b)(i), (iv), (ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90,
37 ILM 1002 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The UNAMA report reflects a similarly high standard. See UNAMA
REPORT, supra note 46, at 12 (“Should an attack against a hospital be found to have been deliberate, it may amount
to a war crime.” (emphasis added)).
68 Rome Statute, supra note 67, Art. 30(1).
69 Id. Art. 30(2).
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international law,70 which may interpret “intentional” to also include a lower “recklessness”
standard.71
The ICC itself may weigh in on the question because it has jurisdiction over Rome Statute
crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan after May 1, 2003.72 In a November 2015
report, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor acknowledged the ongoing NATO and U.S. inves-
tigations, and stated that “[a]lleged crimes committed in Kunduz during the September-
October 2015 events will be further examined by the Office.”73 As of the date of publication,
the ICC has not taken further action following the public release of the U.S. report.
MSF and Human Rights Watch both questioned the U.S. report’s conclusion that no war
crime had occurred.74 Following the public release of the report, the president of MSF Bel-
gium, Meinie Nicolai, stated:
The threshold that must be crossed for this deadly incident to amount to a grave breach
of international humanitarian law is not whether it was intentional or not. . . . [A]rmed
groups cannot escape their responsibilities on the battlefield simply by ruling out the intent
to attack a protected structure such as a hospital.75
Likewise, the Asia Policy Director of Human Rights Watch, John Sifton, asserted that “[w]ar
crimes can . . . be committed through reckless behavior,” and identified a previous instance in
which the U.S. Army had court-martialed an officer for homicide because of reckless con-
duct.76 In light of their concerns, both MSF and Human Rights Watch have called for inde-
pendent investigations into the incident.77
U.S. officials have expressed sympathy for the victims in the wake of the report. When the
report’s findings were first announced in November 2015, General Campbell offered his “sin-
cere condolences to the victims of this . . . tragic, but avoidable accident.”78 In addition, on
March 22, 2016, the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John
W. Nicholson, Jr., met in Kunduz with local officials and victims of the strike. He stated:
I wanted to come to Kunduz personally and stand before the families and the people of
Kunduz to deeply apologize for the events which destroyed the hospital and caused the
70 The Rome Statute itself states that “[n]othing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.” Id. Art. 10.
71 See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, What the Kunduz Report Gets Right (and Wrong), JUST SECURITY (May 10,
2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/30986/kunduz-report-and-wrong/; Alex Whiting, Recklessness, War Crimes,
and the Kunduz Hospital Bombing, JUST SECURITY (May 2, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/30871/reckl
essness-war-crimes-kunduz-hospital-bombing/.
72 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIV-
ITIES (2015) 26, para. 112 (Nov. 12, 2015).
73 Id. at 28, para. 120.
74 See Liu, supra note 38; John Sifton, Pentagon Hospital Attack Report Falls Short, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(May 4, 2016), at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/04/pentagon-hospital-attack-report-falls-short.
75 Initial Reaction from MSF to Public Release of US Military Investigative Report on the Attack on MSF Trauma
Hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, MEDÉCINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Apr. 29, 2016), at http://www.doctorswithou
tborders.org/article/initial-reaction-msf-public-release-us-military-investigative-report-attack-msf-trauma [here-
inafter Initial Reaction from MSF].
76 Sifton, supra note 74.
77 See Initial Reaction from MSF, supra note 75; Sifton, supra note 74.
78 Campbell Briefing, supra note 6.
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deaths of staff, patients and family members . . . I grieve with you for your loss and suf-
fering, and humbly and respectfully ask for your forgiveness.79
Finally, Votel announced on April 29 that
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan leaders have . . . provided condolence payments to more than
170 individuals and families affected by this tragedy. These modest payments are not
designed to compensate the victims or place a value on their lives, but are a gesture of
sympathy.
And the Department of Defense has approved $5.7 million in funds to construct a com-
parable structure in Kunduz that is suitable for use as a medical facility.80
United States Expands Air Strikes Against al-Shabaab; State Department Legal Adviser
Discusses Legal Justification for Counterterrorism Operations Abroad
On March 5, 2016, the U.S. military launched an air strike in Somalia that reportedly killed
more than 150 militants who were training with al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with
Al Qaeda.1 Days later, the Pentagon reported another U.S.-supported attack against a militant
base that left nineteen al-Shabaab fighters dead.2 Carried out by both manned and unmanned
aircraft,3 the first attack targeted a training facility called Raso Camp—approximately 120
miles north of Mogadishu4—during a graduation ceremony for a large group of fighters who
were expected to depart in the near future.5 It was the deadliest attack against al-Shabaab in
more than a decade.6 The second attack was reportedly carried out with American attack heli-
copters and U.S. military personnel serving “in an advisory role” to Somali forces.7
While the Pentagon has characterized these attacks as similar to previous operations,8 news
outlets have described them as a marked escalation and “a sharp tactical shift for U.S. military
79 Mujib Mashal & Najim Rahim, U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Apologizes for Bombing of Hospital, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2016, at A10.
80 Votel Briefing, supra note 11.
1 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Airstrike in Soma-
lia (Mar. 7, 2016), at http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/687305/stateme
nt-from-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-airstrike-in-somalia [hereinafter DOD Raso Statement];
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.S. Airstrike Kills More Than 150 at Somalia Terrorist Camp, Military Says, WASH. POST
(Mar. 7, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/07/u-s-drone-strike-kills-
more-than-150-in-somalia/.
2 Mohammed Ibrahim, Somalia Raid Aided by U.S. Kills Fighters From Shabab, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2016, at
A4.
3 DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.
4 Gibbons-Neff, supra note 1.
5 Pentagon officials declined to disclose how they knew the targeted fighters were “training for a large-scale
attack” against U.S. and AMISOM forces. It has been reported that the military was acting on intelligence gathered
from local sources and American spy planes. Helene Cooper, U.S. Strikes in Somalia Kill 150 Shabab Fighters, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2016, at A1.
6 Id.; see also Gibbons-Neff, supra note 1.
7 Ibrahim, supra note 2. A Pentagon spokesman would not disclose whether the Americans remained on the heli-
copters during the entire operation, but he said the Americans did not “go all the way to the objective” and that the
mission was a “Somali operation.” Id.
8 See Question to the Pentagon from Charlie Savage (Mar. 8, 2016), Answer from Lt. Col. Joe Sowers (Mar. 10,
2016) (2016), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2757459/Shabab-DOD-Statement.pdf
[hereinafter DOD Question-Answer] (referencing Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployment of
United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 883 (Dec. 11, 2015)) (“The
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operations in Somalia.”9 According to the Pentagon, U.S. intelligence monitored the training
camp in Raso for several weeks and concluded that the graduating fighters “posed an imminent
threat to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia.”10 There-
fore, the United States carried out the attack “in self-defense and in defense of our [AMISOM]
partners,” a justification similar to the announced basis for a series of U.S. strikes in 2015.11
The White House press secretary described the attack as a “good example” of how the U.S.
military can work in partnership with local ground forces and said that “[t]he removal of those
terrorist fighters degrades al-Shabaab’s ability to meet the group’s objectives in Somalia,
including recruiting new members, establishing bases, and planning attacks on U.S. and
AMISOM forces.”12
Commentators have characterized the recent large-scale attacks against al-Shabaab as a sharp
divergence from previous American strikes against terrorist groups abroad.13 News sources
reported that the United States launched only about a dozen recorded air strikes in Somalia
since 2003 prior to the attacks in March 2016.14 They also reported anonymous statements
by American officials describing a relaxation of the rules for approving targeted strikes in Soma-
lia due to concerns about a resurgent al-Shabaab.15 Moreover, unlike prior air strikes against
al-Shabaab, which generally targeted individuals who were specifically known to be part of
both al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda,16 the recent attacks were aimed at significantly larger numbers
of rank-and-file al-Shabaab foot soldiers with no reported connection to Al Qaeda. This appar-
ent shift in U.S. practice raises a number of questions about the domestic and international
legal basis for the U.S. expanded air strikes against al-Shabaab and similar terrorist groups.
As a matter of U.S. law, the Pentagon asserted that the Raso attack was carried out under
the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF),17 which authorizes the president to
President has similarly reported that U.S. forces took a series of strikes to support U.S. and AMISOM forces in Soma-
lia in June, July, and November 2015.”).
9 E.g., Sudarsan Raghavan & Craig Whitlock, Despite U.S. Airstrikes, a Somali Militia Is Rising Again, WASH.
POST (Mar. 8, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/despite-us-airstrikes-a-somali-militia-is-
rising-again/2016/03/08/2fdeeeb8-e537-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html.
10 DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8; see also Raghavan & Whitlock, supra note 9 (quoting Army Gen. David
M. Rodriguez, head of U.S. military’s Africa Command) (“The camps [like Raso] are transitory” and pose a concern
“because the last three times they did something similar to this, they had an ability to conduct a devastating attack
on the [African Union] forces.”).
11 DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.
12 The White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Mar. 7, 2016), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-372016 [hereinaf-
ter Earnest Statement].
13 See supra, note 9.
14 Raghavan & Whitlock, supra note 9.
15 Ibrahim, supra note 2.
16 See Robert Chesney, What Is the Domestic Law Basis for U.S. Airstrikes Supporting AMISOM in Somalia?,
LAWFARE ( July 31, 2015), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-domestic-law-basis-us-airstrikes-supporting-
amisom-somalia; Ashley Deeks, Defending Broadened U.S. Strikes Against al Shabaab?, LAWFARE ( July 29, 2015), at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/defending-broadened-us-strikes-against-al-shabaab; see also Letter to Congressional
Leaders on the Global Deployment of United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 428 ( June 11, 2015) (emphasis added) (describing the purpose of U.S. attacks in Somalia as “to counter the
terrorist threat posed by al-Qa’ida and associated elements of al-Shabaab” and identifying the victims of counter-
terrorism strikes as “al-Shabaab operatives who are part of al-Qa’ida”); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Morten-
son, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 199 (2015) (explaining that targets of U.S. strikes in
Syria were tied to Al Qaeda).
17 DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.
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use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [September 11, 2001] terrorist
attacks, or harbored such organizations or persons.”18 Throughout the Bush and Obama
administrations, the executive branch has interpreted the AUMF to apply to “al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and associated forces.”19 The AUMF authorization does not provide a clear basis for
the strikes against al-Shabaab because neither Congress nor the president has ever publicly
identified al-Shabaab as an “associated force” under the statute.20 Instead, the administration
has generally limited the use of force against al-Shabaab to the targeting of specific named indi-
viduals who are known to be personally “associated” with Al Qaeda (sometimes referred to as
“dual-hatted” fighters).21
While the recent strike against low-level fighters at Raso Camp seems by all accounts to be
quite expansive compared to earlier uses of force against al-Shabaab, the Pentagon asserted that
the attack was “authorized by the 2001 AUMF.”22 When questioned by reporters about this
apparent gap between the AUMF’s text and the operation carried out under its mandate, a
Department of Defense spokesman said that while “[s]uch strikes in the tactical defense of U.S.
and partner nation ground force units are not subject to the deliberate analysis [of targeting
only individuals who are deemed to be part of al-Qaeda, they] are considered to be ‘necessary
and appropriate force’ authorized by the 2001 AUMF.”23 He added that “[t]he fact that an
al-Qa’ida-affiliated group has not been identified as an ‘associated force’ for purposes of the
AUMF does not mean that the United States has made a final determination that the group
is not an ‘associated force.’”24
Commentators have suggested various legal theories that might justify the expanded attacks
on al-Shabaab. One suggested that the administration appeared to view the attack as a justified
response to a “continuing and imminent threat” to U.S. military advisers,25 approximately fifty
of whom have been deployed in Somalia since 2013.26 According to this reporter, the U.S.
advisers were dispatched for two reasons: “[T]o help stabilize Somalia against the Shabab as a
whole, and to help counter those elements within the Shabab who have Qaeda links. The sec-
ond motive means that the [AUMF] covers the entire mission.”27 In other words, because the
U.S. advisers were dispatched at least in part to thwart members of al-Shabaab who are “asso-
ciated” with Al Qaeda for purposes of the AUMF, they constituted authorized forces who had
the right to protect themselves from “continuing and imminent” threats. Though not plainly
18 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541 (2006)).
19 Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 16, at 210.
20 Slightly confusing the matter, the U.S. government describes al-Shabaab as “affiliated with” or as “an affiliate
of” Al Qaeda. See DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1. Furthermore, there are reports of the administration inter-
nally debating the status of al-Shabaab due in part to the varying ambitions of its membership: while the group shares
common ideologies with Al Qaeda, many of its members are solely focused on controlling Somalia and so do not
qualify as “associated forces.” See Charlie Savage, At White House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y. Times, Sept.
15, 2011, at A1.
21 Chesney & Deeks, supra note 16.
22 DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Charlie Savage, Is the U.S. Now at War with the Shabab? Not Exactly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2016, at A11.
26 Gibbons-Neff, supra note 1.
27 Savage, supra note 25.
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stated by the administration, this theory assumes that lawfully deployed U.S. forces have the
inherent right to repel “continuing and imminent” threats and that such threats include harms
that the government thinks will materialize in the future and that cannot be stopped without
a preemptive strike.28
When questioned as to whether this theory allows U.S. forces to target all al-Shabaab fighters—
sinceeverymemberof thegrouparguablyposes a “continuing” threat toU.S. advisers inSomalia—
thePentagon’s general counsel stated that the “limitingprinciple”of its positionwas the “specificity
of the intelligence” indicating the likely departure and attack planned by the targeted fighters.29 He
said, “[t]his is not a totally expansive theory that ‘Al Shabab folks are dangerous and they pose a risk
whenever and wherever they are’—that would be an unlimited principle.”30 Rather, “there was a
determination from the commander that this was the last, best opportunity to stop what was
believed to be a very serious attack that there were no adequate defenses for.”31
A different reading of the Pentagon’s statements casts them as an evolving application of the
inherent right to self-defense under domestic constitutional and perhaps statutory law.32
According to the U.S. standing rules of engagement, “[u]nit commanders always retain the
inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or dem-
onstrated hostile intent.”33 Furthermore, this inherent right can extend to other affiliated
forces (such as AMISOM) as designated in the mission rules of engagement.34 Scholars have
debated the source of this inherent right to unit self-defense, but the U.S. government has rou-
tinely grounded it in the president’s Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief.35 The gov-
ernment has also justified limited military operations abroad based on the president’s consti-
tutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations.36
28 At least one scholar has noted the seemingly paradoxical meaning of a threat that is both “continuing” and
“imminent.” Robert Chesney, Airstrikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities: Attacks in Somalia and Questions About
the Current Shape of the Policy, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/airstrikes-outside-are
as-active-hostilities-attacks-somalia-and-questions-about-current-shape-policy. Nevertheless, the U.S. govern-
ment has understood “imminence” broadly such that “[t]he requirement that a targeted person pose an imminent
threat ‘does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests
will take place in the immediate future.’” John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 107 AJIL
462, 466 (2013).
29 Savage, supra note 25 (quoting Robert S. Taylor, acting Pentagon general counsel).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Erica Gaston, Do the Strikes on al Shabaab Stretch the AUMF or The Unit Self-defense Doctrine?, LAWFARE
(Mar. 18, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-strikes-al-shabaab-stretch-aumf-or-unit-self-defense-doctr
ine.
33 Id. (quoting CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR. 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT (SROE)/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (SRUF) FOR U.S. FORCES (13 June 2005)).
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Crook, supra note 28, at 464 (quoting a 2013 Department of Justice White Paper) (“Targeting a mem-
ber of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat of violent attack to the United States is not unlawful. It is a
lawful act of national self defense.”); John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 106 AJIL 670,
671 (2012) (“[A]s a matter of domestic law, the Constitution empowers the president to protect the nation from
any imminent threat of attack.”) (quoting John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Wilson Center: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism
Strategy (April 30, 2012), at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-stra
tegy#).
36 See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 1 (Apr. 1, 2011) (“[W]e believe that . . .
the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign
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However unclear the administration’s theory about the legal basis for its expanded strikes
against al-Shabaab, U.S. Press Secretary Josh Earnest stated unequivocally that the strike at
Raso Camp followed “exactly the kind of counterterrorism strategy that the President has laid
out.”37
As a matter of international law, the administration’s justification for the Raso Camp strikes
appears grounded in the Pentagon’s claim that the attack was carried out “in self-defense and
in defense of [its AMISOM] partners.”38 This reference to self-defense evokes Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” as
an exception to the Article 2(4) principle that all UN members refrain from the “threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity” of any state.39 Beyond that observation, the Pentagon’s
statement did not make specific reference to Article 51 or otherwise offer a detailed explanation
of the why the al-Shabaab strikes comport with international law.
The administration’s views on the use of force more generally, however, were recently elu-
cidated in a speech delivered by Brian Egan, the recently confirmed State Department Legal
Adviser, to the American Society of International Law.40 While Egan’s speech focused on the
use of force against the Islamic State, or ISIL, much of his message was germane to the U.S.
justifications for force against other non-state actors, including al-Shabaab. Egan emphasized
that U.S. military actions “comply with the law of armed conflict” in regard to both the “inter-
national law justification for resorting to the use of force, or the jus ad bellum” and “the jus in
bello—the legal rules we follow in carrying out” the use of force.41 He then went on to elaborate
the current U.S. view on both questions.
In his discussion of jus ad bellum, Egan clarified the administration’s view that “the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in the U.N. Charter is not restricted
to threats posed by States.”42 He also elucidated the administration’s understanding of immi-
nence in the context of self-defense, which relates to the Pentagon’s claim that the targeted al-
Shabaab fighters “posed an imminent threat to U.S. and [AMISOM] forces.”43 According to
Egan, “a State may use force in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense not only in
response to armed attacks that have occurred, but also in response to imminent ones before they
occur.”44 In explaining the origin of this imminence standard, he observed that “for at least the
past two hundred years, States have invoked the right of self-defense to justify taking action on
the territory of another State against non-State actors.”45 Egan then laid out the following fac-
tors analyzed by the United States when considering whether an armed attack is “imminent”:
affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad, even without prior specific congressional
approval.”).
37 Earnest Statement, supra note 12.
38 DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.
39 UN Charter, Arts. 2(4), 51.
40 See Brian Egan, State Dept. Legal Adviser, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law
Annual Meeting: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter
Egan Speech], available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.
44 Egan Speech, supra note 40.
45 Id. (referencing the Caroline incident). At least one scholar has argued that imminence is best understood as
an application of the necessity requirement (discussed infra) rather than as a distinct requirement for the use of force
in self-defense. Marty Lederman, ASIL Speech by State Legal Adviser Egan on International Law and the Use of Force
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[T]he nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack; whether the antic-
ipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the likely scale of
the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence of mit-
igating action; and the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake effec-
tive action in self-defense that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss,
or damage.46
The Raso Camp strikes appear to have been guided by factors like those described by Egan.
A Pentagon spokesman reportedly stated that “[w]e do believe there was a direct threat [and]
that this strike has been successful in reducing that threat.”47 The head of the U.S. military’s
Africa Command told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the last three times [al-Sha-
baab] did something similar to this [graduation ceremony at Raso Camp], they had an ability
to conduct a devastating attack on the [AMISOM] forces.”48 And the acting Pentagon general
counsel reportedly said that “there was a determination . . . that this was the last, best oppor-
tunity to stop what was believed to be a very serious attack that there were no adequate defenses
for.”49 In this light, consider Egan’s comments about the specificity of intelligence needed to
identify an imminent threat:
The absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature
of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes
of the exercise of the right of self-defense, provided that there is a reasonable and objective
basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.50
While the Pentagon described the al-Shabaab fighters as posing an “imminent threat,” it is
unclear whether the United States relied exclusively on Egan’s account of imminence to justify
its recent strikes in Somalia. As of the date of this publication, it is not clear whether the United
States has submitted an Article 51 letter to the United Nations, as required by member states
that rely on self-defense to justify offensive action in another sovereign’s territory.51 In this
light, it is worth noting that Egan’s comments leave space for the possibility that the United
States might be relying on a claim of continuing self-defense against al-Shabaab:
In the view of the United States, once a State has lawfully resorted to force in self-defense
against a particular armed group following an actual or imminent armed attack by that
group, it is not necessary as a matter of international law to reassess whether an armed
attack is imminent prior to every subsequent action taken against that group, provided that
hostilities have not ended.52
Because the Raso Camp strike took place in Somalia, the ad bellum analysis does not end
with justification vis-à-vis al-Shabaab. As Egan explained in his ASIL speech, “international
Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 4, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/30377/asil-speech-state-legal-
adviser-international-law-basis-for-limits-on-force-isil/.
46 Id. (citing, among other things, factors first proposed by Sir Daniel Bethlehem in his article, Self-Defense
Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AJIL 770, 775 (2012)).
47 Raghavan & Whitlock, supra note 9.
48 Id.
49 Savage, supra note 25.
50 Egan Speech, supra note 40.
51 UN Charter, Art. 51 (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be imme-
diately reported to the Security Council.”).
52 Egan Speech, supra note 40.
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law not only requires a State to analyze whether it has a legal basis for the use of force against
a particular non-State actor—which I’ll call the ‘against whom’ question—but also requires
a State to analyze whether it has a legal basis to use force against that non-State actor in a par-
ticular location—which I’ll call the ‘where’ question.”53 Here too, Egan’s speech offers the
most extensive recent explanation of this administration’s understanding of consent and self-
defense in relation to state sovereignty when the United States exercises force in another state’s
territory:
Indeed, under the jus ad bellum, the international legal basis for the resort to force in self-
defense on another State’s territory takes into account State sovereignty. The international
law of self-defense requires that such uses of force be necessary to address the threat giving
rise to the right to use force in the first place. States therefore must consider whether uni-
lateral actions in self-defense that would impinge on a territorial State’s sovereignty are
necessary or whether it might be possible to secure the territorial State’s consent before
using force on its territory against a non-State actor. . . .
It is with respect to this “where” question that international law requires that States must
either determine that they have the relevant government’s consent or, if they must rely on
self-defense to use force against a non-State actor on another State’s territory, determine
that the territorial State is “unable or unwilling” to address the threat posed by the non-
State actor on its territory. . . . This “unable or unwilling” standard is, in our view, an
important application of the requirement that a State, when relying on self-defense for its
use of force in another State’s territory, may resort to force only if it is necessary to do so—
that is, if measures short of force have been exhausted or are inadequate to address the
threat posed by the non-State actor emanating from the territory of another State.54
While “the United States has relied on both consent and self-defense in its use of force
against ISIL,”55 it is not clear that it would need to resort to a claim that Somalia is “unable or
unwilling” to strike al-Shabaab. The federal government of Somalia has been cooperating with
AMISOM, a U.S. partner56 and regional peacekeeping mission that is operated by the African
Union with the approval of the United Nations.57 As part of its mandate to help stabilize the
country,58 AMISOM has conducted joint operations with Somali forces in both offensive and
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. (noting that the UN Charter “does not prohibit an otherwise lawful use of force when undertaken with the
consent of the State upon whose territory the force is to be used”). See also id. (“In Iraq, U.S. operations against ISIL
are conducted with Iraqi consent and in furtherance of Iraq’s own armed conflict against the group. And in Syria,
U.S. operations against ISIL are conducted in individual self-defense and the collective self-defense of Iraq and other
States.”).
56 See Leslie Keopka, U.S., AMISOM Hone Operational Military Decision Making Processes, U.S. AFRICA COM-
MAND ( June 26, 2014), at http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/23262/u-s-amisom-hone-operation
al-military-decision-making-processes; The White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping
in Africa (Aug. 6, 2014), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-pea
cekeeping-africa.
57 AMISOM Background, AMISOM: AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA, at http://amisom-au.org/amisom-
background/ (last visited July 13, 2016); Frequently Asked Questions, AMISOM: AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN
SOMALIA, at http://amisom-au.org/frequently-asked-questions (last visited July 12, 2016) (stating that the prin-
cipal aim of AMISOM is “to provide support for the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to stabilize the
country and foster political dialogue and reconciliation”).
58 AMISOM Mandate, AMISOM: AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA, at http://amisom-au.org/amisom-
mandate/ (last visited July 13, 2016).
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defensive missions against al-Shabaab.59 Furthermore, in public statements about the recent
strikes in Somalia, the Pentagon has made multiple references to its partnership with African
Union forces. A spokesperson described the Raso Camp attack as “in the tactical defense of U.S.
and partner nation ground force units,”60 and asserted that “[t]he removal of these fighters
degrades al-Shabaab’s ability to meet the group’s objectives in Somalia, including recruiting
new members, establishing bases, and planning attacks on U.S. and AMISOM forces.”61
Egan’s observations on jus in bello, or the legal rules that govern the carrying out of offensive
action, are also relevant to the U.S. strike on Raso Camp. Since al-Shabaab is a nonstate actor,
Egan’s observations about ISIL would apply here in full: “[T]he applicable international legal
regime governing [these] military operations is the law of armed conflict covering NIACs [non-
international armed conflicts], most importantly, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and other treaty and customary international law rules governing the conduct of hos-
tilities in [NIACs].”62
In his speech, Egan highlighted a few specific targeting rules that the administration regards
as applicable to all parties in a NIAC. First, he said that “parties must distinguish between mil-
itary objectives, including combatants, on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on
the other. Only military objectives, including combatants, may be made the object of attack.”
He defined “military objectives” as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.” Egan also elaborated on some possible misunderstandings about how the United
States determines whether specific individuals may be lawful objects of attack:
In many cases we are dealing with an enemy who does not wear uniforms or otherwise seek
to distinguish itself from the civilian population. In these circumstances, we look to all
available real-time and historical information to determine whether a potential target
would be a lawful object of attack. To emphasize a point that we have made previously,
it is not the case that all adult males in the vicinity of a target are deemed combatants.
Among other things, the United States may consider certain operational activities, char-
acteristics, and identifiers when determining whether an individual is taking a direct part
in hostilities or whether the individual may formally or functionally be considered a mem-
ber of an organized armed group with which we are engaged in an armed conflict. For
example, with respect to membership in an organized armed group, we may examine the
extent to which the individual performs functions for the benefit of the group that are anal-
ogous to those traditionally performed by members of State militaries that are liable to
59 See, e.g., AMISOM Press Release, AU Chairperson Condemns Attempted Attack Against AMISOM in Somalia
( June 9, 2016), at http://amisom-au.org/2016/06/au-chairperson-condemns-attempted-attack-against-amisom-
in-somalia/ (describing defensive operations carried out jointly by AMISOM and the Somali National Army); AMI-
SOM Press Release, Remarks by Ambassador Francisco Caetano Jose Madeira, African Union Special Represen-
tative for Somalia and Head of AMISOM at the Security Council Briefing on Somalia ( Jan. 28, 2016), at http://
amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/REMARKS-BY-AMBASSADOR-FRANCISCO-CAETANO-
JOSE%CC%81-MADEIRA.pdf (describing “joint operations” between the Somali National Army and AMISOM
troops, which “facilitate continued offensive operations”).
60 DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.
61 DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.
62 Egan Speech, supra note 40.
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attack; is carrying out or giving orders to others within the group to perform such func-
tions; or has undertaken certain acts that reliably indicate meaningful integration into the
group.
Egan also noted that in addition to these targeting rules, the United States adheres to “the
fundamental law of armed conflict principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity, and
humanity.”63 Finally, Egan emphasized that “[i]n many cases, the United States imposes stan-
dards on its direct action operations that go beyond the requirements of the law of armed con-
flict.” For example, he said that although the United States is not party to the 1977 Additional
Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and thus not bound to comply with it under treaty
law, U.S. practice is “already consistent with the Protocol’s provisions.” He also discussed the
Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, a set of policy standards that guide the United States’
use of lethal force against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities.64 Consistent with
prior statements by the Obama administration, Egan said that these standards “exceed what
the law of armed conflict requires.”65
In closing his speech, Egan explained the importance of U.S. compliance with international
law in all armed conflicts:
We comply with the law of armed conflict because it is the international legal obligation
of the United States; because we have a proud history of standing for the rule of law;
because it is essential to building and maintaining our international coalition; because it
enhances rather than compromises our military effectiveness; and because it is the right
thing to do.66
63 Id. The Obama administration has previously discussed these jus in bello principles with respect to targeted
strikes. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 106 AJIL 670, 671 (2012) (quoting a
speech by John O. Brennan, then Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, who
defines the principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity, and asserts that U.S. targeted strikes
conform to all of them).
64 Id.; see also John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 107 AJIL 674 (2013) (announcing
the codification of the PPG as “a framework that governs [U.S.] use of force against terrorists—insisting upon clear
guidelines, oversight and accountability”). Scholars have debated whether Somalia qualifies as an “area of active hos-
tilities.” See, e.g., Robert Chesney, supra note 28 (observing that it is unclear whether Somalia is an area of active
hostilities and questioning whether the Raso Camp strikes were consistent with the PPG). Although Egan did not
discuss Somalia specifically, he said that “[f]or the purposes of the PPG, the determination that a region is an ‘area
of active hostilities’ takes into account, among other things, the scope and intensity of the fighting.” Egan Speech,
supra note 40.
65 Egan Speech, supra note 40. Egan focused on one of the PPG standards—namely, the “threshold of ‘near cer-
tainty’ that non-combatants will not be injured or killed.” He described this standard as “higher than that imposed
by the law of armed conflict, which contemplates that civilians will inevitably and tragically be killed in armed con-
flict.” Id.
66 Id.
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